Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility under Heterogeneous Beliefs

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Goy ◽  
Cars H. Hommes ◽  
Kostas Mavromatis
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Heterogeneous Beliefs ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

scholarly journals The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2019 (375) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
◽  
Enrique Martínez-García ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

scholarly journals The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (375) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
◽  
Enrique Martínez-García ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

scholarly journals The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
Enrique Martínez-García
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Us ◽  
Imperfect Credibility ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (375) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
◽  
Enrique Martínez-García ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

A Comparative Assessment on the Role of Central Bank in a Wholesale Banking System

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-236
Author(s):  
Byeong-Ryul Lee
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Comparative Assessment

Deflation Risk in the Euro Area and Central Bank Credibility

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Galati ◽  
Zion Gorgi ◽  
Chen Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
Central Bank Credibility
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