scholarly journals The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (375) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
◽  
Enrique Martínez-García ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

scholarly journals The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
Enrique Martínez-García
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Us ◽  
Imperfect Credibility ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

scholarly journals Public Debt and Changing Inflation Targets

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael U. Krause ◽  
Stéphane Moyen
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Pronounced Effect ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Moderate Increase ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Inflation Target ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Maturity Structure ◽  
Inflation Targets

What are the effects of a higher central bank inflation target on the burden of real public debt? Several recent proposals have suggested that even a moderate increase in the inflation target can have a pronounced effect on real public debt. We consider this question in a New Keynesian model with a maturity structure of public debt and an imperfectly observed inflation target. We find that moderate changes in the inflation target only have significant effects on real public debt if they are essentially permanent. Moreover, the additional benefits of not communicating a change in the inflation target are minor. (JEL E12, E31, E52, H63)

scholarly journals Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (9) ◽  
pp. 2477-2512 ◽  
Author(s):  
George-Marios Angeletos ◽  
Chen Lian
Keyword(s):  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Feedback Loops ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Aggregate Level ◽  
Standard Practice ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Forward Looking

How does the economy respond to news about future policies or future fundamentals? Standard practice assumes that agents have common knowledge of such news and face no uncertainty about how others will respond. Relaxing this assumption attenuates the general equilibrium effects of news and rationalizes a form of myopia at the aggregate level. We establish these insights within a class of games which nests, but is not limited to, the New Keynesian model. Our results help resolve the forward-guidance puzzle, offer a rationale for the front-loading of fiscal stimuli, and illustrate more broadly the fragility of predictions that rest on long series of forward-looking feedback loops. (JEL D82, D83, D84, E12, E23, E52, E62)

Money and Credit in the New Keynesian Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Offick ◽  
Hans-Werner Wohltmann
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Credit Channel ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Static Approximation ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Interest Rate

AbstractThis paper integrates a money and credit market into a static approximation of the baseline New Keynesian model based on a money-and-credit-in-the-utility approach, in which real balances and borrowing contribute to the household’s utility. In this framework, the central bank has no direct control over the interest rate on bonds. Instead, the central bank’s instrument variables are the monetary base and the refinancing rate, i. e. the rate at which the central bank provides loans to the banking sector. Our approach gives rise to a credit channel, in which current and expected future interest rates on the bond and loan market directly affect current goods demand. The credit channel amplifies the output effects of isolated monetary disturbances. Taking changes in private (inflation and interest rate) expectations into account, we find that - contrarily to BERNANKE and BLINDER (1988) - the credit channel may also dampen the output effects of monetary disturbances. The expansionary effects of a monetary expansion may be substantially diminished if the monetary disturbance is accompanied by a contractionary credit shock. In a dynamic version of our model, in which expectations are formed endogenously, we find that the credit channel amplifies output responses.

scholarly journals Optimal Forward Guidance

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 310-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin O. Bilbiie
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium ◽  
Bad News ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Simple Rule ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Liquidity Trap ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Dynamic Stochastic

Optimal forward guidance is the simple policy of keeping interest rates low for some optimally determined number of periods after the liquidity trap ends and moving to normal-times optimal policy thereafter. I solve for the optimal duration in closed form in a new Keynesian model and show that it is close to fully optimal Ramsey policy. The simple rule “announce a duration of half of the trap’s duration times the disruption” is a good approximation, including in a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. By anchoring expectations of Delphic agents (who mistake commitment for bad news), the simple rule is also often welfare-preferable to Odyssean commitment. (JEL D84, E12, E43, E52, E56)

scholarly journals Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Andrade ◽  
Gaetano Gaballo ◽  
Eric Mengus ◽  
Benoît Mojon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Heterogeneous Beliefs ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Guidance Policy ◽  
The Cost

Central banks’ announcements that rates are expected to remain low could signal either a weak macroeconomic outlook, which would slow expenditures, or a more accommodative stance, which may stimulate economic activity. We use the Survey of Professional Forecasters to show that, when the Fed gave guidance between 2011:III and 2012:IV, these two interpretations coexisted despite a consensus on low expected rates. We rationalize these facts in a New-Keynesian model where heterogeneous beliefs introduce a trade-off in forward guidance policy: leveraging on the optimism of those who believe in monetary easing comes at the cost of inducing excess pessimism in non-believers. (JEL D83, E12, E43, E52, E58, E65)

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