The Tragedy of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ – Hardin vs. the Property Rights Theorists

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Karpoff
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Commons

scholarly journals Arctic meltdown: A problematic property rights structure translates into poor resource management

SURG Journal ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-13
Author(s):  
Olivia Mancuso
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  
Resource Management ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Arctic ◽  
Resource Extraction ◽  
Open Communication ◽  
Natural Resource Extraction ◽  
The Commons

As access to the Arctic region continues to grow, many land-use issues have become increasingly prominent. The exposure of shorter shipping routes, unresolved maritime boundaries between the bordering states, and most importantly, the plethora of renewable and non-renewable resources in the region have created a strain on international relations between the states bordering the Arctic. Rising global temperatures have created the promise and opportunity of better access to natural resources in the coming years, raising the likelihood of potentially substantial economic gains to the bordering states. However, the current property rights structure in the Arctic, as governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), dictates that the jurisdiction of each coastal nation state shall not exceed past 200 nautical miles beyond the coastline of each respective state. The goal of this report is to provide an assessment of the basic property rights that govern the Arctic territory in an attempt to illuminate how current and future inefficiencies in natural resource extraction and management can result from a poor property rights structure. The current property rights structure has led to a departure from an efficient allocation of rights and as a result currently operates under an anticommons scenario, while also setting the stage for a tragedy of the commons in the not so distant future. To move away from these sub-optimal outcomes and toward more efficient resource management, open communication, cooperation, and better defined property rights are important components needed to strengthen resource management among Arctic states. Keywords: Arctic land-use and property rights (assessment of); natural resource extraction and management (inefficiencies in); anticommons scenario; tragedy of the commons; Arctic Council; UNCLOS

Give Us Back Our Tragedy: Nonrivalry in Intellectual Property Law and Policy

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 633-670 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Bracha
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Information Goods ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Distinct Category ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Commons

Abstract Information goods form the most distinct category of nonrival resources in regard to which one person’s ability to use the resource is not lessened by another person’s use. Nonrival goods are not subject to the tragedy of the commons and as a result the most common modern justification for property rights is absent in regard to them. Therefore intellectual property rights, unlike many other property rights, may perform a beneficial function only with respect to the dynamic incentive to produce information goods. With respect to static use of existing information, intellectual property rights serve no beneficial function and always have a negative effect. This fundamental and ostensibly well-understood element of intellectual property theory has important implications for the policy analysis of intellectual property rights compared to other institutional alternatives (including a commons) and for the design of such rights. Because it poses a fundamental challenge to the idea of a uniform theory of property, the assumption of nonrivalry of information has been subjected to attacks by scholars who sought to introduce the tragedy of the commons to this realm and reintegrate intellectual property rights into standard property analysis. Other scholarship rejects the attacks on nonrivalry but often obscures the full implications of this feature of information goods. This article explains the centrality of nonrivalry in the policy analysis of information goods and the challenge it poses to a unified theory built on the concept of the tragedy of the commons. It explains the unfortunate tendency to obscure the full implications of nonrivalry, explores the various attempts to restore a tragedy of the commons framework to the analysis of information goods, and exposes the flaws of these arguments. The article concludes by explaining the implications of the nonrivalry of information goods for a properly understood general theory of property built around the salient positive and normative features of resources.

The Expanses of Sustainability and the Limits of Privatarianism

1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Common Property ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Resource Conservation ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Sustainability Problems

AbstractA review of contributions to the resource conservation literature shows that sustainability problems are seen as caused by “common property.” This “tragedy of the commons” is understood as the result of the failure to assign fully property rights to individuals. The supporting assumptions and premises to these “privatarian” arguments are explicated and examined. After refuting the main premises, it is argued that the application of neoclassical assumptions and premises overlooks other legitimate forms of ownership as effective solutions to the tragedy of the commons. In revisiting other categories of ownership, the limits of privatarianism are identified and the prospects for solutions to sustainability problems are expanded.

scholarly journals Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (3) ◽  
pp. 725-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian R Copeland ◽  
M. Scott Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Resource Management ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Management Regimes ◽  
The Commons

We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons, and hence the de facto property rights regime, is endogenously determined. Three forces determine success or failure in resource management: the regulator's enforcement power, the extent of harvesting capacity, and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished. The model can explain heterogeneity across countries and resources in the effectiveness of resource management, and it predicts that changes in prices, population, and technology can cause transitions to better or worse management regimes. (JEL P14, Q21, Q22, Q23, Q32)

"Once? No. Twenty times? Sure!" Repeated decisions and uncertainty in the tragedy of the commons

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Hardisty ◽  
Howard Kunreuther ◽  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Poonam Arora
Keyword(s):  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
The Commons
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