scholarly journals Leading by Example in a Public Goods Experiment with Benefit Heterogeneity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Yu

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priyodorshi Banerjee ◽  
Sujoy Chakravarty ◽  
Ruchika Mohanty




2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.



2017 ◽  
Vol 138 ◽  
pp. 99-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Arne Brekke ◽  
James Konow ◽  
Karine Nyborg




Author(s):  
Urs Fischbacher ◽  
Simon G�chter ◽  
Ernst Fehr






Author(s):  
Matthias M. Cinyabuguma ◽  
Louis G. Putterman ◽  
Talbot Page


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