Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald B. Davies ◽  
Carsten Eckel
2006 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Burbidge ◽  
Katherine Cuff ◽  
John Leach

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Baldwin ◽  
Toshihiro Okubo

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald B Davies ◽  
Carsten Eckel

This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by their productivities. Because taxes affect the distribution of firms, they affect wages, prices, and the number of firms. From the social planner's perspective, optimal taxes efficiently distribute income between private and public consumption and are harmonized, providing the optimal number of firms. This is not a Nash equilibrium. As is common in such models, equilibrium taxes are inefficiently low. Furthermore, there is no pure strategy equilibrium with equal taxes resulting in too many firms. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and a new benefit from harmonization. (JEL H21, H25, H87)


2017 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 392-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Guido Cozzi ◽  
Yuichi Furukawa ◽  
Chih-Hsing Liao

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Baldwin ◽  
Toshihiro Okubo

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