scholarly journals Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Baldwin ◽  
Toshihiro Okubo
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms

scholarly journals Tax competition with heterogeneous firms

2006 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Burbidge ◽  
Katherine Cuff ◽  
John Leach
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms

scholarly journals Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Baldwin ◽  
Toshihiro Okubo
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms

Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald B Davies ◽  
Carsten Eckel
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Public Consumption ◽  
The Social ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Optimal Taxes ◽  
Number Of Firms

This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by their productivities. Because taxes affect the distribution of firms, they affect wages, prices, and the number of firms. From the social planner's perspective, optimal taxes efficiently distribute income between private and public consumption and are harmonized, providing the optimal number of firms. This is not a Nash equilibrium. As is common in such models, equilibrium taxes are inefficiently low. Furthermore, there is no pure strategy equilibrium with equal taxes resulting in too many firms. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and a new benefit from harmonization. (JEL H21, H25, H87)

Tax competition and the activity of the regional tax policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
S. M. Drobyshevsky ◽  
N. S. Kostrykina ◽  
A. V. Korytin
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Tax Incentives ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Tax Legislation ◽  
Tax Exemptions ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Regional Budgets

The problem of efficiency of regional tax expenditures is an actual issue of the fiscal policy and fiscal federalism in Russia. A large fiscal autonomy allows federal subjects to realize a more active tax policy to attract new investments. One cannot claim current fiscal powers of the Russian regions to be wide. However, not all the regions use even existing tax policy instruments. Moreover, out of the regions that use them only few provide incentives to stimulate investment decisions. Others use regional tax measures to support businesses that already have strong positions in the region. And it is an open question whether such tax incentives are efficient. On the other hand, an aggressive tax competition for investors can also be wasteful for regional budgets. In this paper, we calculate indicators that characterize the depth and scope of tax exemptions provided at the regional level. The calculations are based on the open tax statistics. Through the analysis of the tax legislation as well as the economic structure of selected regions, we reveal the inducements of their higher activity: federal regional tax policy, tax competition or benefits for budget-forming companies of the region.

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