Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry: The Case of Heterogeneous Fixed Costs

Author(s):  
Ronald B. Davies ◽  
Carsten Eckel
2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-71
Author(s):  
Manoj Kumar

This paper studies how technology diffusion interacts to endogenously determine the productivity distribution and generate aggregate growth. This paper models firms that choose to adopt technology, or produce with their existing technology. In the context of technology diffusion, one therefore has to consider whether redistributive revenues of the government may, in fact, be allocated towards reducing the fixed costs associated with productive technologies. This paper presents a model in which the cost of technology diffusion is endogenous and varies across heterogeneous firms. The results indicate that the technology with low productivity is used by the majority of individuals in the early stages of development. At this stage, a relatively higher level of inequality characterizes the income distribution. As capital deepening and redistribution of income and wealth takes place, the inequality among individuals tends to decrease. Once this happens individuals prefer a relatively larger proportion of government revenue to be allocated towards cost-reducing Research and Development (R&D) expenditures. Eventually all individuals make the switch to the better technology and consequently their incomes converge.


2006 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Burbidge ◽  
Katherine Cuff ◽  
John Leach

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Baldwin ◽  
Toshihiro Okubo

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald B Davies ◽  
Carsten Eckel

This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by their productivities. Because taxes affect the distribution of firms, they affect wages, prices, and the number of firms. From the social planner's perspective, optimal taxes efficiently distribute income between private and public consumption and are harmonized, providing the optimal number of firms. This is not a Nash equilibrium. As is common in such models, equilibrium taxes are inefficiently low. Furthermore, there is no pure strategy equilibrium with equal taxes resulting in too many firms. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and a new benefit from harmonization. (JEL H21, H25, H87)


2017 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 392-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Guido Cozzi ◽  
Yuichi Furukawa ◽  
Chih-Hsing Liao

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard E. Baldwin ◽  
Toshihiro Okubo

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