United States Export Subsidies in Wheat: Strategic Trade Policy or Expensive Beggar‐Thy‐Neighbor Tactic?

1992 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 534-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Anania ◽  
Mary Bohman ◽  
Colin A. Carter
POLITEA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Umi Qodarsasi

<p class="06IsiAbstrak"><strong>The Strategic Trade Policy of China in Sub-Saharan Africa Countries</strong>.<strong> </strong>In the past decade, Sub-Saharan Africa has been transformed into the 'rising continent'. The growth of the Sub-Saharan economy averages 6%. Some countries in Sub-Saharan are included in the most developed countries in the world. Economic growth, abundant natural resources, and a large population become the potential of Sub-Sahara to become a main trading partner for China as a global economic power. To enhance trade cooperation, China formed a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Through this forum, China offers a new development model, namely the Beijing consensus by prioritizing the principle of non-interference. This research aimes to find out the strategic trade policy of China to enhance economic benefits from multilateral cooperation. This research applies descriptive qualitative research method with the strategic trade policy as the research analytical framework. This research finds that China applies some of strategic trade policy in Sub Sahara Africa : sectoral targets, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), liberation of foreign investation, and export subsidies.</p><p class="07KatakunciKeywords">Keywords: FOCAC Strategic Trade Policy (STP), Sub-Sahara Afrika</p><p class="07KatakunciKeywords"> </p>


Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).


2022 ◽  
Vol 43 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Finn Roar Aune ◽  
Simen Gaure ◽  
Rolf Golombek ◽  
Mads Greaker ◽  
Sverre A.C. Kittelsen ◽  
...  

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