Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use

1996 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 428-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent H. Smith ◽  
Barry K. Goodwin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Crop Insurance ◽  
Agricultural Chemical

COSTLY YIELD VERIFICATION, MORAL HAZARD, AND CROP INSURANCE CONTRACT FORM

1997 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 393-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles E. Hyde ◽  
James A. Vercammen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Crop Insurance ◽  
Insurance Contract ◽  
Contract Form

Moral Hazard Cycles in Individual‐Coverage Crop Insurance

1994 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Vercammen ◽  
G. Cornelis Kooten
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Crop Insurance

Estimating the Extent of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance Using Administrative Data*

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Roberts ◽  
Nigel Key ◽  
Erik O'Donoghue
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Administrative Data ◽  
Crop Insurance

An Expected‐Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance

1997 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 216-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith H. Coble ◽  
Thomas O. Knight ◽  
Rulon D. Pope ◽  
Jeffery R. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Crop Insurance

scholarly journals Evaluating Changes to Prevented Planting Provision on Moral Hazard

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (02) ◽  
pp. 315-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher N. Boyer ◽  
S. Aaron Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Crop Insurance ◽  
Insurance Coverage ◽  
Coverage Factor ◽  
Coverage Level ◽  
Soybean Production ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Post Moral Hazard ◽  
The Impact

AbstractPrevented planting provision in crop insurance protects producers from failure to plant attributable to natural causes. We determined the impact of this provision at various crop insurance coverage levels on prevented planting claims and ex post moral hazard. The moral hazard incentive in the prevented planting provision is stronger for corn than soybeans. Reducing the prevented planting coverage factor for corn could likely reduce moral hazard, but the degree of the reduction will likely depend on the revenue protection coverage level. Conversely, we found moral hazard is unlikely to occur for soybean production regardless of the revenue protection coverage level.

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