Errata: Withdrawn Security Offerings

W. Mikkelson; M. Partch

doi:10.2307/2331085

Errata: Withdrawn Security Offerings

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ◽

10.2307/2331085 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 23 (4) ◽

Cited By ~ 36

Author(s):

W. Mikkelson ◽

M. Partch

Keyword(s):

Security Offerings

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The Legal Implications of Digital Security Offerings

The LegalTech Book ◽

10.1002/9781119708063.ch36 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 139-141

Author(s):

Eleftherios Jerry Floros

Keyword(s):

Legal Implications ◽

Security Offerings

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Information conveyed by seasoned security offerings: evidence from components of the bid–ask spread

Review of Financial Economics ◽

10.1016/s1058-3300(00)00018-5 ◽

2000 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 83-99 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Raymond M Brooks ◽

Ajay Patel

Keyword(s):

Bid Ask Spread ◽

Security Offerings

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The impact of the financial crisis on earnings management: Empirical evidence from Italian and Spanish listed companies

Corporate Ownership and Control ◽

10.22495/cocv16i2art12 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 121-130 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Francesco De Luca ◽

Francesco Paolone

Keyword(s):

Financial Crisis ◽

Financial Markets ◽

Performance Indicators ◽

Listed Companies ◽

Publicly Traded ◽

Publicly Traded Companies ◽

Time Period ◽

Security Offerings ◽

The Impact ◽

Giving Bad News

Our study adopts a reliable and widely acknowledged model to detect accounts manipulation in order to assess the impact of the financial crisis on Italian and Spanish listed companies’ propensity to manage their earnings. The analysis is conducted on 565 publicly traded companies on the Italian and Spanish financial markets during the time period 2005-2013. We find a lower propensity to manipulate earnings in both countries during the pre-crisis period (2005-2008) as suggested by a decrease in the number of high-risk manipulators until 2008 included. With the spread of the financial crisis, companies become more manipulators. We believe that the reason for this is to avoid giving bad news to markets, investors, and lenders after that the crisis may have impacted too negatively on firms’ performance indicators and financial equilibrium. Our empirical results provide various implications for further studies related to managements’ incentives concurrently with security offerings.

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