scholarly journals Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules

1989 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Robert Gertner
1990 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Scott Johnston

Author(s):  
Tomasz Serwach

The purpose of the chapter is to present recent theoretical developments in FDI theories with an emphasis on sourcing strategies of firms. It is stated that economic theory explains the existence of the so called vertical FDI as the result of market failures or transaction costs and incomplete contracts. Firms engage in foreign sourcing due to lower costs or an access to unique resources but that sourcing takes place within firms' boundaries in order to benefit from internalization advantages. Although recent theories have been developed in the context of FDI from developed countries, those new insights can be easily applied to the case of outward FDI from emerging economies as well.


Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg

Chapter 36 considers issues that result from the incompleteness of a contract. In economic theory a complete contract is a contract that specifies the parties’ rights, duties, and remedies under every possible state of the world. Under this conception every contract is incomplete, because it would be prohibitively expensive to delineate the effect of all possible future states and the consequences of each state. In contract law the term incomplete contract means a contract that is gappy or indefinite in important respects. The law on incomplete contracts concerns when a contract has too many gaps or is too indefinite to enforce, when and how a court should fill gaps in a contract, what is the effect of a provision in an agreement that contemplates the later execution of a final contract, and when is there a duty to negotiate in good faith to make an incomplete contract sufficiently complete or to reach a contemplated final contract.


2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Mikko Wennberg

This discussion is a critique of Professor Randy E. Barnett's solution to the problem of filling in gaps in incomplete contracts. The articles discussed are “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent” (1992) and “Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud” (1992).


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