Political Institutions and International Cooperation

1982 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 479-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Strange

This article questions the usefulness of the concept of regimes on the grounds that it is a fad; ambiguous and imprecise; value-biased towards order rather than change or equity; essentially static in its interpretation of the kaleidoscopic reality of international cooperation and conflict; and, finally, rooted in a limiting, state-centric paradigm. Each of these objections represents a dragon that unwary young scholars should be warned to avoid—or at least to treat with caution. On the grounds that those who look for a tidy general theory encompassing all the variety of forces shaping world politics are chasing a will o' the wisp, the article suggests as an alternative that we should pay attention to the overlapping bargaining processes, economic and political, domestic as well as international, by which the outcomes of the interaction of states, of authorities with markets and their operators, and of political institutions and economic enterprises, determine between them the "who-gets-what" of the international political economy.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jeremy Bowling

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] This dissertation examines few of the determinants and effects of international cooperation. There are three broad themes that run throughout this dissertation, which are the ideas of reciprocity, opportunity, and cooperative norms. Reciprocity is a large part of the development of cooperation theory, particularly in the study of the evolution of cooperation. While it is mentioned across international relations scholarship, empirical testing of its existence in international politics is scarce. Opportunity is a ubiquitous concept across social science. The concept is used in this dissertation as a challenge to the notion that cooperation reduces the likelihood of conflict, which pervades the study of international conflict, particularly from those that study conflict from the theory of liberalism. Lastly, an exploratory analysis of cooperative norms is examined. Studying the social construction of cooperative norms is important for the broader study of international cooperation. I find that direct and indirect reciprocity are important indicators of cooperation, cooperation will increase the likelihood and severity of dyadic conflict unless both states are highly cooperative with each other, and domestic political institutions may be important for the development of cooperative norms that extend to the international level. Overall, international relations scholars should reexamine how cooperation in viewed and studied, particularly in relation to conflict.


1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Snidal

The study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game model, but there is a mistaken tendency to treat PD as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation. By relaxing the assumptions of 2 × 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game, I show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in PD. The analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions: number of strategies available, number of iterations of the game, numbers of players, and the distribution of power among them. The discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation, and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored. The basic solutions for PD and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization, stability, and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system. However, the coordination model does not replace the PD model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions. These results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations.


2004 ◽  
pp. 66-76
Author(s):  
E. Hershberg

The influence of globalization on international competitiveness is considered in the article. Two strategies of economic growth are pointed out: the low road, that is producing more at lower cost and lower wages, with increasingly intensive exploitation of labor and environment, and the high road, that is upgrading capabilities in order to produce better basing on knowledge. Restrictions for developing countries trying to reach global competitiveness are formulated. Special attention is paid to the concept of upgrading and opportunities of joining transnational value chains. The importance of learning and forming social and political institutions for successful upgrading of the economy is stressed.


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