Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?

CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 54-55
Author(s):  
William H. Sackley
Keyword(s):  
2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aigbe Akhigbe ◽  
Anna D. Martin ◽  
Takeshi Nishikawa

2009 ◽  
Vol 62 (8) ◽  
pp. 797-804 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Valero ◽  
Hei Wai Lee ◽  
Nianyun (Kelly) Cai

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 159-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert C Feenstra

How costly is protectionism? This paper begins from a U.S. perspective, examining the costs to both the U.S. and other countries from U.S. protectionism. It emphasizes that substantial costs are imposed on foreign countries by U.S. protectionism. These costs result from the highly selective nature of protection in particular industries and against particular exporting countries. No discussion of the costs of protection would be complete without mentioning the increasing levels of investment by foreign firms within the U.S. economy. The paper next moves to a more global policy perspective. The emerging free trade areas in Europe, North America, and Asia raise the prospect of gains from trade within each region but also the possibility of global costs from protectionist actions across the regions.


2004 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig Doidge ◽  
G.Andrew Karolyi ◽  
René M Stulz
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-126
Author(s):  
Maria Arbatskaya ◽  
Hugo M Mialon

Abstract The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits U.S.-related firms from making bribes abroad. We analyze the FCPA’s effects in a model of competition between a U.S. and foreign firm for contracts in a host country. If the FCPA only applies to the U.S. firm, it reduces that firm’s competitiveness and either increases bribery by the foreign firm or reduces overall investment. If the FCPA also applies to foreign firms, it reduces total bribery, and in host countries with high corruption levels, it increases total investment. The model suggests that the FCPA will deter bribery and stimulate investment while not disadvantaging U.S. firms if its enforcement is aimed at firms who engaged in bribery in highly corrupt countries and whose main competitors are also subject to the FCPA.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aigbe Akhigbe ◽  
Anna D. Martin ◽  
Takeshi Nishikawa

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