scholarly journals Ordinal Or Cardinal Utility: A Note

Studia Humana ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
Walter E. Block ◽  
Robert Wutscher
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Type ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Microeconomic Theory ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Mainstream Economic ◽  
Preference Relations ◽  
Official Position ◽  
Ordinal Preference

Abstract Modern microeconomic theory is based on a foundation of ordinal preference relations. Good textbooks stress that cardinal utility functions are artificial constructions of convenience, and that economics does not attribute any meaning to “utils.” However, we argue that despite this official position, in practice mainstream economists rely on techniques that assume the validity of cardinal utility. Doing so has turned mainstream economic theorizing into an exercise of reductionism of objects down to the preferences of ‘ideal type’ subjects.

Cardinal Utility Functions and Managerial Behavior

1960 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert N. Halter ◽  
Christoph Beringer
Keyword(s):  
Utility Functions ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Managerial Behavior

Ordinal Preference Games: An Analysis of Legislative Coalition Formation Without Transferable Utility

1983 ◽  
Vol 78 (3) ◽  
pp. 750-763 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Koehler
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Size Principle ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Ordinal Preferences ◽  
Ordinal Preference ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Voting Strategy

Two important findings from n-person game theory are that coalition formation is superadditive if and only if a game possesses an empty core, and Riker's size principle. Up to the present, both theorems have been proved and critiqued under the assumption of transferable cardinal utility.This analysis eliminates the cardinal utility assumption on the grounds that it is generally inconsistent with the conditions that characterize collective choice on political issues. Instead, a model of collective decision making is set forth in terms of ordinal preferences, and the two theorems are reconsidered. The superadditivity theorem survives intact, whereas the size principle is weakened. Circumstances are identified in which there is no incentive to reduce an oversized winning coalition; however, under no condition is there an incentive to increase the size of a winning coalition. A number of coalition-size hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the U.S. Senate. The results raise new questions about the role of coalition formation in legislative voting strategy.

scholarly journals Least Concave Ordinal Utility Function and the Marshalian Cardinal Utility

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
Taradas Bandyopadhyay ◽  
Tapan Biswas
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Cardinal Utility ◽  
Ordinal Utility

This paper examines the conditions under which the Marshallian type of cardinal utility function can be derived from a class of ordinal utility functions.

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