Dynasty Control of the Process of Forming Coalition of Political Parties in the 2020 Cilegon Local Leaders Election

This paper discusses the power of political dynasties in Cilegon in the process of forming a coalition of political parties in the 2020 Pilkada. The embodiment of political dynasties continues to be accommodated to perpetuate power by putting aside the track record of organizing experience both in parties and in state institutions. The theory used in this study is the theory of political dynasties and party coalitions. The research method uses a qualitative study with an explanatory case study approach. The focus of this study is to explain how coalition maps are formed and how the influence of dynasties on political parties. The results of this study indicate that the strong influence of political dynasties in Cilegon arises because of the power that has been held since Cilegon City was founded after Banten officially became a province. At that time the elected mayor was Tubagus Aat Syafaat and continued with his sons Tubagus Iman Ariyadi and Ratu Ati Marliati until the 2020 Local Leader Election. The family mainly used the Golkar Party and lower-middle parties to perpetuate their power to form the Minimum Winning Coalition model so that passed the nomination process. Keywords: political dynasty; party coalition; pilkada; cilegon cityAbstrak Tulisan ini membahas kekuatan dinasti politik yang ada di Kota Cilegon dalam proses pembentukan koalisi partai politik di Pilkada tahun 2020. Pengejawantahan dinasti politik terus diakomodasi untuk melanggengkan kekuasaan dengan menyampingkan rekam jejak pengalaman pengorganisasian baik di partai maupun di kelembagaan negara. Teori yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah teori dinasti politik dan koalisi partai. Adapun metode penelitian menggunakan kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus eksplanatoris. Fokus kajian ini yaitu mengupas tentang bagaimana peta koalisi terbentuk dan bagaimana pengaruh dinasti terhadap partai-partai politik. Adapun hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa pengaruh kuat dari dinasti politik di Cilegon muncul akibat dari kekuasaan yang dimiliki sejak Kota Cilegon berdiri setelah Banten resmi menjadi Provinsi. Saat itu yang terpilih sebagai Walikota yaitu Tubagus Aat Syafaat dan dilanjut dengan anaknya Tubagus Iman Ariyadi dan Ratu Ati Marliati sampai pada saat Pilkada 2020. Keluarga tersebut memanfaatkan utamanya Partai Golkar dan partai-partai menengah-bawah untuk melanggengkan kekuasaannya untuk membentuk model Minnimal Winning Coalition agar lolos proses pencalonannya. Kata Kunci: dinasti politik; koalisi partai; pilkada; kota cilegon

Chlöe Swarbrick’s Auckland Central Victory

In the 2020 election, Chlöe Swarbrick won the Green party’s second-ever electorate seat, in Auckland Central. A high-profile candidate, an experienced campaign team, some favourable conditions, and mass engagement enabled Swarbrick to build a winning coalition. For socialists, who are returning to electoral politics throughout liberal democracies, the skills required to win electoral campaigns are key. With an emphasis on ‘building a community, not an army’, the Swarbrick campaign offers useful lessons in how to build and sustain political engagement. With a more explicitly socialist political agenda and a stronger organising theory of change, election campaigns could provide a spark for a left political movement in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Four Types of Japanese Regional Policy in the Perspective of Liberal Intergovernmentalism

What are the determinants of Japan’s regional policies? This article argues that Japan’s regional policy is the result of the government’s strategic choice made through processes of domestic and international bargaining. Based on liberal intergovernmentalism, this article focuses on the level of domestic preferences for East Asia and the threat of China. In the first stage, the preference of the Prime Minister and political winning-coalition groups matter. In the second stage, the level of the threat of China is a pivotal variable. In combining these two variables, the article proposes the following four types of ideal regional policies for Japan: (1) pro-East Asia policy; (2) expanded-Asia policy; (3) interactive policy; and (4) reactive policy. To substantiate this idea, the article traces Japan’s regional policy trajectory from the Yoshida Cabinet to the Hatoyama Cabinet. An in-depth case study shows that Japanese cabinets vary in their regional policies in the way this article expected from each ideal type based on liberal intergovernmentalism.

Wielding power in multiparty negotiations: the impact of communication medium and assertiveness

Purpose The medium negotiators choose for communication will influence both process and outcome. To understand how medium influences power expression, this paper aims to compare value claiming by asymmetrically powerful negotiators, using face-to-face and computer-mediated messaging across two studies. Following up on long-standing conjectures from prominent coalition researchers, the authors also directly tested the role of the apex negotiator's personality in coalition formation and value expropriation. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted two laboratory experiments which manipulated communication medium (computer-mediated vs face-to-face) in three- and four-person bargaining. They also varied asymmetry of power so the apex negotiator either could not be left out of a winning coalition (Study 1) or could be (Study 2). The authors measured trait assertiveness along with multiple indicators of hard bargaining behavior. Findings Communicating using instant messages via a computer interface facilitated value claiming for powerful negotiators across both studies. Trait assertiveness correlated with hard bargaining behavior in both studies. An index of hard bargaining behavior mediated the effect of assertiveness on value expropriation but only in the context where the powerful negotiator held a genuine monopoly over coalitions. Originality/value The authors contribute to the literature on multiparty negotiations by demonstrating persistent media effects on power utilization and by finally confirming the conjectures of prominent coalition researchers regarding personality. Though personality traits generate consistent effects on behavior, their influence on negotiation outcomes depends on the power structure. Negotiation theory needs to incorporate structural and situational factors in modelling effects of enduring traits. Negotiation research should move beyond a rigid focus on dyads.

From Fragile to Collapsed Statehood: The Case of the Republic of Yemen (1990-2020)

The unification of the two Yemeni states?the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), respectively?in 1990 has been a resounding failure. Merging the tribal-dominated northern and state-party dominated southern regimes meant increasing the number of factions competing for access to state resources to satisfy material and security needs of their respective networks of influence. In particular, efforts at growing the resource base of the unified state after 1990, by means of an expansion of oil and gas exploration and extraction, raised the revenue base of the state in an unsustainable manner. Such growth in national oil and gas rents increased rather than decreased competition over state authority to control the spoils. The major subsequent events, such as the 1994 civil war, the 2004-2010 “Saada wars” against the Houthi movement, the Yemeni version of the “Arab Spring” in 2011, the failure of the National Dialogue Conference (March 2013-January 2014), and the start of the Saudi and Emirati bombing campaign and subsequent ground war in Yemen since March 2015 all triggered major clashes between different factions of the Yemeni state bureaucracy, army, and civil society. On each of these occasions, efforts to freeze out some Yemeni actors produced escalating conflict between the remaining factions instead of a winning coalition that could have reestablished a degree of stability. The article explains how local, regional, and global factors have jointly overwhelmed the Yemeni actors, and how foreign intervention has led to the further deterioration of the pre-existing national crisis.

Collective Deterrence in the Shadow of Shifting Power

Twelve of twenty-six war-winning coalitions since 1815 have seen at least two members go to war against one another after victory. What separates durable and fragile war-winning coalitions? To answer this question, we analyze a game-theoretic model of shifting intra-coalition power and collective deterrence. We show that (1) shifting power within war-winning coalitions can undermine commitments to the postwar settlement, but (2) revisionist threats from a powerful defeated side can enhance the credibility of commitments within the winning coalition, securing peace when intra-coalition war would otherwise be inevitable. We also recover these patterns in empirical models of the outbreak of war between former coalition partners: shifting power within a coalition is associated with increased probabilities of intra-coalition war, but only when the defeated side is not too powerful. A common enemy can thus preserve peace between former partners who would otherwise go to war over the terms of shared victory.

RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, AND CONSTITUTION MAKER IN INDONESIA

Most political literature argues that outcomes in Indonesian constitutional reform 1999-2002 were determined mainly by the political actors. Notwithstanding the existing research providing insightful evidence, there is still a gap in which those literature discount the role of the party system in shaping and constraining the way the political actors within a party behave. Drawing on one of the new institutionalism concepts – ‘rational choice institutionalism' – the argument puts forth here is that Indonesian multi-party system (independent variable) forced the political parties (intermediary variable) to form a winning-coalition which finally produced a compromised outcome (dependent variable) of constitutional reform on the articles about relations between president and legislature.

Indonesia-North Korea Diplomatic Relations: Effort to Pursue National Interest and Create Regional Peace [Hubungan Diplomatik Indonesia – Korea Utara: Upaya Mewujudkan Kepentingan Nasional dan Menciptakan Perdamaian Regional]

This article aims to analyze the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards North Korea over its approximately fifty-nine years of bilateral relations, since 17 June 1961. The arguments posited in this regard is that the implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy towards North Korea has been counterproductive. Under the leadership of President Joko Widodo, Indonesia actually has great potential to influence North Korea’s conducts through the close diplomatic relations that the two countries have developed. The friendship between Indonesia and North Korea began since the two states conducted reciprocal official visits 1964 and 1965. Indonesia’s foreign policy towards South Korea has often been carried out to influence the offensive decisions of North Korean leaders, especially in relation to the issue of nuclear weapon development. The key question is what should and can Indonesia do next to help create peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula by adhering to the principles of a free and active foreign policy? Why is it necessary for Indonesia to do this and how can Indonesia carry out this foreign policy towards North Korea? After becoming President since 2011, Kim Jong-un had to weaken his father’s winning coalition to consolidate domestic political stability. However, North Korea’s domestic market reforms have had the effect of eroding the Kim family’s ideological appeal. This is relevant to the expansion of political influence from Pyongyang, which prioritizes the continuation of a fragile centralized authoritarian power while maintaining sustainable domestic economic growth.AbstrakArtikel ini bertujuan menjelaskan secara analitis bagaimana implementasi kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia terhadap Korea Utara selama 59 tahun sejak 17 Juni 1961. Argumen yang ingin disampaikan tentang implementasi kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia terhadap Korea Utara adalah kontraproduktif. Indonesia di bawah kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo berpotensi besar untuk mampu memengaruhi perilaku Korea Utara melalui hubungan diplomatik. Persahabatan Indonesia dan Korea Utara dimulai sejak saling kunjung di 1964 dan 1965. Orientasi politik luar negeri Indonesia di masa lalu hingga saat ini, telah sering dilakukan untuk memengaruhi keputusan ofensif para pemimpin Korea Utara, khususnya terkait dengan isu pengembangan senjata nuklir. Pertanyaannya adalah apa yang harus dan sebaiknya dilakukan Indonesia selanjutnya untuk membantu menciptakan perdamaian dan stabilitas di Semenanjung Korea dengan tetap berpegang pada prinsip politik luar negeri bebas dan aktif? Mengapa hal tersebut perlu dilakukan oleh Indonesia dan bagaimana cara menjalankan kebijakan luar negeri terhadap Korea Utara tersebut? Kim Jong-un, setelah menjadi Presiden sejak 2011, harus melemahkan posisi koalisi pemenang ayahnya untuk konsolidasi stabilitas politik dalam negeri. Bagaimanapun, reformasi pasar domestik Korea Utara telah berdampak pada pengikisan daya tarik ideologis keluarga Kim. Hal ini relevan dengan perluasan pengaruh politik dari Pyongyang memprioritaskan pada keberlangsungan kekuatan otoriter terpusat yang rentan seiring bagaimana dapat mempertahankan pertumbuhan ekonomi dalam negeri berkelanjutan.

Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way that a winning coalition in a partition is always one for which the sum of the weights of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is called decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that in general, plurality games need not be weighted, even not when they are decisive. After that, we prove that (i) decisive plurality games with at most four players, (ii) majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and (iii) decisive plurality games that exhibit some kind of symmetry, are weighted. Complete characterizations of the winning coalitions in the corresponding partitions are provided as well.