scholarly journals Corruption and Growth in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 256
Author(s):  
Wei-Bin Zhang

This study introduces some new perspectives of bureaucratic corruption into the dynamic general equilibrium theory recently proposed by Zhang. The main concern of our study is the role of corruption on economic growth and income and wealth distribution between the officials and workers. The economy is composed of the industrial sector and public sector. The population is classified into officials and workers. Corruption takes places through many channels. Officials take brides from producers and households. The model describes dynamic interactions of growth, corruption with fixed tax rate and corruption rates. We simulate the model to demonstrate existence of equilibrium and motion of the dynamic system. We also examine effects of changes in different parameters on the motion of the economic system.

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (5) ◽  
pp. 1835-1849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher L House ◽  
Matthew D Shapiro

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze and quantify the aggregate effects of the timing of tax rate changes enacted in 2001 (which called for successive rate reductions through 2006) and 2003 (which made immediate tax rate cuts scheduled for 2004 and 2006). The phased-in nature contributed to the slow recovery from the 2001 recession, while the elimination of the phase-in helped explain the increase in economic activity in 2003. The simulations suggest while the tax policy was a drag on the economy in 2001 and 2002, it increased economic growth in 2003, once phase-ins were eliminated.


Modern China ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Yuan Gao

The theoretical focus of neoclassical economics experienced a significant change in the 1970s–1980s. General equilibrium theory lost its dominant position in theoretical economic studies, with its role of setting the research agenda taken over by what this article calls the “new microeconomic theories,” principally decision theory, game theory, and mechanism design. Mainstream economists, post-Keynesians, and historians of economic thought each give a different explanation of the hows and whys of that change, but all miss some critical methodological implications. That change, as this article discusses, shows that neoclassical economics has turned from “grand theory” toward “small models” with empirically delimited utility and that the ideology of marketism lacks a valid scientific foundation. This interpretation can help illuminate the deeper dynamics of the postwar development of neoclassical economics and provide insights for a new political economy that can come to grips with political-economic practices that cannot be fully grasped by the neoclassical tradition.


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