Three Corruption Scandals, Three Field Experiments

Corruption vulnerabilities turn to actual threats when officials calculate that the benefits of abusing their power are greater than the penalties associated with getting caught. By a similar logic, the formula for corruption control requires increasing the probability of detecting corruption (that is, of activating the eye) through enhanced monitoring and then credibly threatening to apply the appropriate penalty in response to wrongdoing (cracking the whip). As discussed in this introductory chapter, the present book contributes evidence-based recommendations on how societies can go about fighting bureaucratic corruption. The chapter describes the methodological rigor that characterizes the field experimental method, prior to summarizing three original and successive field experiments on corruption control. These experiments represent the book’s core contribution.

The Eye and the Whip

Corruption vulnerabilities exist where government officials have power over the provision of goods and the imposition of costs. Building permits and infrastructure contracts are examples of state-issued goods. Traffic tickets and tax liabilities are examples of costs levied by the state. These and other corruption vulnerabilities turn to actual threats when officials calculate that the benefits of abusing their power are greater than the penalties associated with getting caught. By a similar logic, the formula for corruption control requires increasing the probability of detecting corruption (that is, of activating the eye) through enhanced monitoring and then credibly threatening to apply the appropriate penalty in response to wrongdoing (cracking the whip). Notably, the common policy response to corruption often emphasizes only the first of the two mechanisms. Governments prioritize transparency measures but avoid the risks associated with confronting corruption. Therefore, as a means to improve on the current state of affairs, this book examines distinct approaches to promoting accountability, especially accountability among the set of unelected officials responsible for regulating the built environment. It analyzes the results of field experiments on corruption control conducted in the City of Querétaro in central Mexico, urban and peri-urban districts in Peru, and two of New York City’s boroughs. The book contributes evidence-based recommendations for how societies can go about fighting bureaucratic corruption.

Controlling Corruption

Institutional checks on corruption are central to virtually every reform strategy, but they do not come in any standard form, and are unlikely to succeed in isolation. Some are aimed primarily at bureaucratic corruption, some more at political corruption, and some of the most important operate in both realms. Anticorruption agencies (ACAs) have been established—sometimes repeatedly—in around a hundred societies but have an indifferent track record. They are most likely to succeed when supported by a range of other strong governing institutions. Transparency is also a common institutional reform, and it too has consequences that are varying and contingent on local and cross-border influences. Conflict of interest legislation, and whistleblower protections, are also important issues in numerous societies. Specific institutional controls, in the end, require sound supportive institutions of several sorts; even then, the political, economic, and social challenges of corruption control remain formidable.

Moral Values and Ethics as Antidotes for Corruption in the South African Public Service and Administration

This paper examines the relationship between morals, ethics, public administration and corruption. The argument advanced is that morals and ethics are antidotes for bureaucratic corruption in public service and administration. Currently there seems to be low ethics and morality in public service and administration in South Africa. The discussions in this paper consider the obligations under the South African National Development plan 2030, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration, and the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development for a corruption free and ethical public service and administration.

Statistically Validated Indices for COVID-19 Public Health Policies

In this paper we present six new indices generated from a Bayesian measurement model that allow us to combine policy data from two of the most comprehensive COVID-19 policy datasets, the CoronaNet COVID-19 Government Response Event Dataset and the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker. By doing so we can validate both independent sources of data and provide more information than either dataset on its own. We estimate these time-varying indices with summary scores for each day from January 1st, 2020 to January 15th, 2021 for over 180 countries and six policy categories: social distancing policies, school-related policies, business-related policies, health monitoring policies, health resources policies and mask-related policies. We also estimate models that predict these indices with a range of social, public health, political and economic covariates. Our results show that business restrictions and social distancing restrictions are strongly associated with reduced general anxiety while school restrictions much less so. Furthermore, school restrictions are associated with higher rates of personal contact with people outside the home, higher levels of income inequality and bureaucratic corruption. Finally, we also find that heads of state who are women are more likely to implement a broad array of pandemic-related restrictions than male leaders.

LEVIATHAN FOR SALE: MARITIME POLICE PRIVATIZATION, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, AND THE SEWOL DISASTER

We argue that the 2014 Sewol ferry disaster in South Korea, in which 304 passengers perished, was a result of the mode and process of privatization of South Korea's maritime police and rescue services. Through the development of a nuanced theory of privatization and use of a novel conceptualization of corruption, coupled with empirical analysis, our study shows that the outcome was symptomatic of a wider trend of systematic bureaucratic rent-seeking. A pro-active private sector ready to capitalize on the opportunity, in conjunction with a permissive political environment, resulted in a reduction of state capacity, with devastating consequences.