On the Recent Controversies Surrounding the Distinction between Deductive Argument and Inductive Argument

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 107-130
Author(s):  
Wonbae Choi

The basic issue surrounds whether the law has been broken. We have been told Mary has been charged with theft under s 1 of the Theft Act. We are to assume that the three statements provided containing all of the information in this scenario have been produced just for us to read and work on. For the purposes of this exercise we will assume that these statements were produced in ways not calling into doubt their admissibility or credibility. This means therefore that we only have to concentrate on their probative value. (What do they prove?) The seven point approach of Twining and Miers will be used. 1 Standpoint: the standpoint of the Chart is that of the author of this book demonstrating the Wigmore Chart Method for the purposes of demonstrating the method and argument construction. 2 Stages 2, 3 and 4: relate to setting up the propositions and then key listing and charting. The impossibility of approaching each task in an isolated way is immediately perceived as we are going to work from statements. We have to find out the facts before we can draft the UP, PP, and interim probanda. Task: so that you can appreciate the levels of analysis go back to the statements and highlight the key words and phrases that begin to allow you to break into them and locate the story, and the law. Then try to give answers to the following questions: (1) What are the relevant facts? (2) What key phrases in the statements give you clues as to the application of the law? (3) Can you construct the deductive argument for the prosecution? (4) Can you construct the inductive argument for the prosecution? (5) Can you construct the opposing inductive argument for the defence? (6) Are there any conditions of doubt in your mind surrounding the wording of s1(1) of the Theft Act which may apply? (For example questions surrounding the presence of both mens rea and actus reus.) DO NOT PROCEED UNTIL YOU HAVE ANSWERED QUESTIONS (1)–(6).

2012 ◽  
pp. 253-254

1989 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Gary Martin ◽  
Guershon Harel

This study asked 101 preservice elementary teachers enrolled in a sophomore-level mathematics course to judge the mathematical correctness of inductive and deductive verifications of either a familiar or an unfamiliar statement. For each statement, more than half the students accepted an inductive argument as a valid mathematical proof. More than 60% accepted a correct deductive argument as a valid mathematical proof; 38% and 52% accepted an incorrect deductive argument as being mathematically correct for the familiar and unfamiliar statements, respectively. Over a third of the students simultaneously accepted an inductive and a correct deductive argument as being mathematically valid.


1994 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
George Bowles

In this paper I examine five distinctions between deductive and inductive arguments, concluding that the best of the five defines a deductive argument as one in which conclusive favorable relevance to its conclusion is attributed to its premises, and an inductive argument as any argument that is not deductive. This distinction, unlike its rivals, is both exclusive and exhaustive; permits both good and bad arguments of each kind; and is both useful and needed in evaluating at least some arguments.


1988 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 121-133
Author(s):  
R. G. Swinburne

Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for granted; if the argument works, the premises provide grounds for affirming the conclusion. A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises necessitate, that is, entail, the conclusion. (It would involve a self-contradiction to assert the premises but deny the conclusion.) What I shall call a ‘correct’ inductive argument is one in which the premises in some degree probabilify the conclusion, but do not necessitate it. More precisely, in what I shall call a correct P-inductive argument the premises make the conclusion probable (i.e. more probable than not); in what I shall call a correct C-inductive argument, the premises add to the probability of the conclusion (i.e. confirm it, make it more probable than it was; but do not necessarily make it overall probable). Arguments only show their conclusions to be true if they start from true premises; arguments of the above types which work (i.e. are valid or correct) and do start from such premises I will call sound arguments. Arguments are only of use to show to an individual that the conclusion is true if he already knows the premises to be true. Most of what I shall have to say today concerns arguments with respect to which there is no doubt that the premises are true.


Think ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (33) ◽  
pp. 37-39
Author(s):  
Ted Parent

Some logic textbooks say, as if it were the received wisdom, that inductive arguments are partly defined by the thinker's intentions. The claim is that an inductive argument is one where the premises are intended to make the conclusion likely. This contrasts with a deductive argument, where the premises are intended to entail the conclusion. However, since entailing is one way of making more likely, a further way to distinguish induction is needed. The addition offered is that the premises are not intended to entail the conclusion. Taken together, the result is: (1) An argument is inductive if the premises are (a) intended to make the conclusion likely, but (b) not intended to entail the conclusion.


1988 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 121-143
Author(s):  
R. G. Swinburne ◽  
D. C. Barrett

Arguments move from premises to conclusions. The premises state things taken temporally for granted; if the argument works, the premises provide grounds for affirming the conclusion. A valid deductive argument is one in which the premises necessitate, that is, entail, the conclusion. (It would involve a self-contradiction to assert the premises but deny the conclusion.) What I shall call a ‘correct’ inductive argument is one in which the premises in some degree probabilify the conclusion, but do not necessitate it. More precisely, in what I shall call a correct P-inductive argument the premises make the conclusion probable (i.e. more probable than not); in what I shall call a correct C-inductive argument, the premises add to the probability of the conclusion (i.e. confirm it, make it more probable than it was; but do not necessarily make it overall probable). Arguments only show their conclusions to be true if they start from true premises; arguments of the above types which work (i.e. are valid or correct) and do start from such premises I will call sound arguments. Arguments are only of use to show to an individual that the conclusion is true if he already knows the premises to be true. Most of what I shall have to say today concerns arguments with respect to which there is no doubt that the premises are true.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-330
Author(s):  
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht ◽  

Methodological naturalists regard scientific method as the only effective way of acquiring knowledge. Quite the contrary, traditional analytic philosophers reject employing scientific method in philosophy as illegitimate unless it is justified by the traditional methods. One of their attacks on methodological naturalism is the objection that it is either incoherent or viciously circular: any argument that may be offered for methodological naturalism either employs a priori methods or involves a vicious circle that ensues from employing the very method that the argument is aimed to show its credentials. The charge of circularity has also been brought against the naturalistic arguments for specific scientific methods; like the inductive argument for induction and the abductive argument for the inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I respond to the charge of circularity using a meta-methodological rule that I call ‘reflexivity requirement.’ Giving two examples of philosophical works, I illustrate how the requirement has already been considered to be necessary for self-referential theories. At the end, I put forward a meta-philosophical explanation of the naturalism-traditionalism debate over the legitimate method of philosophy.


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