The Quietist Posit: A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia

<p>This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”. I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa. I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language.</p>

The Quietist Posit: A Methodologically Agnostic Resolution to the Problem of Qualia

<p>This thesis paper addresses the aim and methodology of an argument by Daniel Dennett (1988; 1992), who proposes an eliminativism with regards to the referent of the term “qualia”. Dennett’s argument centres on the purported failure for any property to meet the criteria for this term widely found in traditional philosophical literature. Dennett argues that this failure may be demonstrated as a result of the term failing to refer to any property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I provide, in this paper, an outline of two key historical arguments by W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, respectively, whose influence on Dennett’s position will help clarify a certain vulnerability in the latter’s argument. I then provide a series of arguments to serve as important counterexamples to the methodology employed by Dennett which, I argue, reveal a dialectical stalemate between two sets of competing methodologies –methodological naturalism and phenomenology. I argue that this stalemate is indicative of a methodological underdetermination with regards to the question of whether qualia exist. I refer to this as the “methodological problem of qualia”. I then propose that a resolution may be found for this problem by adopting a methodological agnosticism. I argue that upon this agnosticism, it is possible to positively assert methodological verification conditions according to which it may be determined whether the term “qualia” refers to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. I argue that these are the conditions which hold upon the explicitly conditional, or “methodological”, assumption of a naturalistic methodological verificationism, as opposed to a phenomenological methodology, or vice versa. I conclude that, under these conditions, the term “qualia” therefore may succeed in referring to a property which contains naturalistic methodological verification conditions. As such, I propose that Dennett is incorrect: neither the term nor its referent merit elimination, but rather the latter a quietist resolution, and the former its own meaningful place in language.</p>

Daniel Coit Gilman and the Model for a Modern University

Daniel Coit Gilman became the founding president of The Johns Hopkins University in 1876. There he established what became the model for modern American universities. Gilman had similar New England roots to other major university leaders. His first experience of leadership was at the University of California. That university started in Berkeley in 1868 when a Presbyterian college, the College of California, ceded itself to the state. Gilman had to negotiate the tensions between being an inclusive state university while having a distinct denominational heritage. The New Johns Hopkins University was accused of being atheistic, but Gilman instituted voluntary chapel and showed concern for including Christian dimensions in the undergraduate curriculum. Following the German model though, he made original scholarship and graduate education the marks of a true university. While not anti-religious, intellectual inquiry was expected to adopt standards that might be called “methodological naturalism.”

Second Thoughts on Naturalistic Theism and Model of Levels of Analysis: A Response to Mark Harris

I shall show that Dr. Harris’ study of biblical scholarship is treated in a very serious manner in my paper, as it is the element identifying him as a representative of naturalistic theism (NT). NT is a position that has been recognized in the literature on science and religion for several years. Dr. Harris’ commitment to the rule of methodological naturalism in the natural sciences, as well as his lack of evidence for the limits of using it in his hermeneutical analysis of divine action, makes his academic papers represent the main assumptions of NT. Model of levels of analysis (MLA) helps to show the empirical character of accounts of divine action as an important part of the traditional theistic interpretation of this action, and scepticism towards such an interpretation as a main characteristic of all advocates of NT.

Naturalism as Metaphysics, Reduction without Fears

Part IV turns to an extended engagement with the academic study of religion, which is often constitutively hostile to any form of theology. Chapter 12 considers the place of “naturalism” and “reductionism” in the academic study of religion. While individual scholars of religion can—and often should—practice methodological naturalism, attempts to justify methodological naturalism as a global, field-defining norm inevitably presuppose controversial metaphysical claims, and thereby collapse into ontological naturalism—a position that I call “ontological naturalism on the cheap.” The chapter concludes that any barriers to including analytic theology in the wider field of religious studies are local and prudential, not global and methodological.

Methodological Naturalism and Reflexivity Requirement

Methodological naturalists regard scientific method as the only effective way of acquiring knowledge. Quite the contrary, traditional analytic philosophers reject employing scientific method in philosophy as illegitimate unless it is justified by the traditional methods. One of their attacks on methodological naturalism is the objection that it is either incoherent or viciously circular: any argument that may be offered for methodological naturalism either employs a priori methods or involves a vicious circle that ensues from employing the very method that the argument is aimed to show its credentials. The charge of circularity has also been brought against the naturalistic arguments for specific scientific methods; like the inductive argument for induction and the abductive argument for the inference to the best explanation. In this paper, I respond to the charge of circularity using a meta-methodological rule that I call ‘reflexivity requirement.’ Giving two examples of philosophical works, I illustrate how the requirement has already been considered to be necessary for self-referential theories. At the end, I put forward a meta-philosophical explanation of the naturalism-traditionalism debate over the legitimate method of philosophy.

GOD, SCIENCE, AND METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM

In this paper, I call into question a commonly assumed principle in science known as methodological naturalism, which is the idea that science should only accept natural, as opposed to supernatural, explanations. In support of MN, two arguments are commonly thrown against the idea of theistic explanation in science: the science stopper argument and the God-of-the-gaps argument. The science stopper argument states that appealing to theistic explanations hinders science from making steady progress; it simply stops science from its tracks. In other words, abandoning MN spells the death of science. The God-of-the-gaps argument states that appealing to God when explaining phenomenon is a form of an argument from ignorance, what critics call God-of-the-gaps thinking, which is considered to be fallacious reasoning. Any gap in nature that is explained by God, so the argument goes, is simply an appeal to our ignorance that we have no yet found the correct explanation to such natural mystery. In this scenario, an appeal to God is assumed to simply show our lack of knowledge with regard to the workings of nature. After introducing these arguments, I assess their strength by looking at the history of methodological naturalism. I then show how the history of science does not only fail to support these arguments but actually refutes them.

A Point by Point Response to Don Wiebe: A Manifesto for the Scientific Study of Religion

A point by point response to Wiebe’s ‘Manifesto’, mostly in support of the ‘methodological naturalism’—with added precautions on the current use of the term ‘science’. A philosophy for the study of religion is called for, with an epistemological range that caters for collective methodologies and social ontologies; respects the analytic distinction between ‘subject matter’ and ‘theoretical object’—and, ultimately, the theory-ladenness of all talk about ‘religion’. Naturalism is not about givens in the study of meaningful human behavior.

Support for the Systematic Study of Religion : A Response to Markus Davidsen

Reacting positively to Markus Davidsen’s call for a Dutch programme of systematic study of religion, this response highlights certain points of discussion that should be considered moving forward. First of all, we should consider letting students get familiar with theories about religion earlier in the curriculum. Secondly, philological competences should not be placed above other methodological competences. Thirdly, our comparative methods should be informed by postmodernist critiques. Fourthly, we should be careful when applying cognitive theory by understanding its limitations. Finally, it remains unclear why methodological naturalism is the only way to move forward.