Discrete growth, real output, and inflation: An additive perspective on the index number problem

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen D. Casler
1960 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham S. Becker

How large is the Soviet gross national product (GNP) relative to our own? A third as large? Half? Two-thirds? Which of the estimates is correct? As the unique solution, none of them, unfortunately. Nor need we search for other numbers: these are probably the best of the lot, and in any case, the reply would be the same. The problem is not one of data, or of definitions, or of estimating methods. Such problems do exist and present difficulties of their own, but the inescapable and immovable barrier to the unique solution in US-USSR national output comparisons is the crucial fact of differences in the structures of the American and Soviet economies. In general, in comparisons of different economies or of the same economy at different times, diverse structures create what the economist calls an “index-number problem.” The worst of it is, the “problem” is insoluble.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-122

Bert M. Balk of the Rotterdam School of Management at Erasmus University reviews “The Index Number Problem: Construction Theorems”, by Sydney Afriat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents a solution to the index number problem. Discusses the new formula; the power algorithm; combinatorics; consistency; and illustration. Includes a section on construction theorems that discusses the system of inequalities ars > xs − xr; the principles of choice and preference; utility construction revisited; the construction of separable utility functions from expenditure data; the connection between demand and utility; and revealed preference revealed.”


Econometrica ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Barzel
Keyword(s):  

Utilitas ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Warke

This article develops an unconventional perspective on the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill in at least four areas. First, it is shown that both authors conceived of utility as irreducibly multi-dimensional, and that Bentham in particular was very much aware of the ambiguity that multi-dimensionality imposes upon optimal choice under the greatest happiness principle. Secondly, I argue that any attribution of intrinsic worth to any form of human behaviour violates the first principles of Bentham's and Mill's utilitarianism, and that this renders both authors immune to the claim by G. E. Moore that they committed a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Thirdly, in light of these contentions, I find no flaw in Mill's ‘proof of utility’. Fourthly, I use the notion of intrapersonal utility weights to provide an interpretation of Mill's qualitative hedonism that is entirely consistent with his value monism.


1944 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 91 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Rothbarth
Keyword(s):  

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