Bruno Pontecorvo and the neutrino

2014 ◽  
Vol 184 (5) ◽  
pp. 531-538 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.M. Bilenky
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (5) ◽  
pp. 489-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
S M Bilenky
Keyword(s):  

1974 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 755-757
Author(s):  
A P Aleksandrov ◽  
N N Bogolyubov ◽  
V P Dzhelepov ◽  
S M Korenchenko ◽  
M A Markov ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Daniel W. B. Lomas

Chapter Five studies Ministerial reactions to the spy scandals that threatened Anglo-American nuclear exchanges. Considering the cases of Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, it argues that Ministers were sensitive to claims from the United States that Britain was weak in the field of security. After the Fuchs and Pontecorvo scandals, Ministers reacted quickly to repair any damage to transatlantic relations by introducing new security procedures known as ‘Positive Vetting’. The chapter also uses newly released archival material to shed light on Ministerial reactions to the disapperance of the Foreign Office diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, in the spring of 1951. Their defection provoked widespread outrage and, once again, prompted a review of security in government, on this occasion the Foreign Office, on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, now Foreign Secretary, which is explored here for the first time.


Physics Today ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 47 (10) ◽  
pp. 87-88
Author(s):  
Lev Okun
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMONE TURCHETTI

This paper focuses on the defection of nuclear physicist Bruno Pontecorvo from Britain to the USSR in 1950 in an attempt to understand how government and intelligence services assess threats deriving from the unwanted spread of secret scientific information. It questions whether contingent agendas play a role in these assessments, as new evidence suggests that this is exactly what happened in the Pontecorvo case. British diplomatic personnel involved in negotiations with their US counterparts considered playing down the case. Meanwhile, the press decided to play it up, claiming that Pontecorvo was an atom spy. Finally, the British secret services had evidence showing that this was a fabrication, but they did not disclose it. If all these manipulations served various purposes, then they certainly were not aimed at assessing if there was a threat and what this threat really was.


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