Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Landeo ◽  
Kathryn Spier

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Walzl ◽  
Eberhard Feess


Author(s):  
A. Mitchell Mitchell Polinsky ◽  
Steven Shavell


Economica ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 71 (283) ◽  
pp. 333-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eberhard Feess ◽  
Markus Walzl


2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary E. Marche

Although corruption and optimal law enforcement literature have addressed the effects of corruption, little has been done to analyze the decision to become corrupt. For example, little is known about risk preferences and how they might affect the nature of a corrupt exchange scheme. To answer this question, a theoretical analysis is developed that considers the noncoercive incentivea and circumstances necessary for a law enforcement official, assumed averse to criminal risk, to choose a corrupt exchange with organized crime that involves murder. Risk-aversion and the severity of the crime involved are shown to reduce the likelihood of detecting the corruption scheme and murder is shown to be optimal. Corruption schemes involving less risk averse offenders are analyzed and compared.





2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUIN-JEN CHANG ◽  
HUEI-CHUNG LU ◽  
MINGSHEN CHEN


2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Garoupa ◽  
Mohamed Jellal




2011 ◽  
Vol 119 (5) ◽  
pp. Back Cover-Back Cover
Author(s):  
Glen Weyl


1996 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith N. Hylton


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