AND, INJUSTICE FOR SOME CORRUPT EXCHANGE AND THE RISK-AVERSE OFFICIAL

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary E. Marche
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Enforcement Official ◽  
Optimal Law Enforcement

Although corruption and optimal law enforcement literature have addressed the effects of corruption, little has been done to analyze the decision to become corrupt. For example, little is known about risk preferences and how they might affect the nature of a corrupt exchange scheme. To answer this question, a theoretical analysis is developed that considers the noncoercive incentivea and circumstances necessary for a law enforcement official, assumed averse to criminal risk, to choose a corrupt exchange with organized crime that involves murder. Risk-aversion and the severity of the crime involved are shown to reduce the likelihood of detecting the corruption scheme and murder is shown to be optimal. Corruption schemes involving less risk averse offenders are analyzed and compared.

Risk Preferences and Incentives for Evidence Acquisition and Disclosure

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 314-342
Author(s):  
Erin Giffin ◽  
Erik Lillethun
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Optimal Design ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Low Risk ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Good Decision ◽  
Legal Rules

Abstract Civil disputes feature parties with biased incentives acquiring evidence with costly effort. Evidence may then be revealed at trial or concealed to persuade a judge or jury. Using a persuasion game, we examine how a litigant’s risk preferences influence evidence acquisition incentives. We find that high risk aversion depresses equilibrium evidence acquisition. We then study the problem of designing legal rules to balance good decision making against the costs of acquisition. We characterize the optimal design, which differs from equilibrium decision rules. Notably, for very risk-averse litigants, the design is “over-incentivized” with stronger rewards and punishments than in equilibrium. We find similar results for various common legal rules, including admissibility of evidence and maximum awards. These results have implications for how rules could differentiate between high risk aversion types (e.g., individuals) and low risk aversion types (e.g., corporations) to improve evidence acquisition efficiency.

scholarly journals ORGANIZED CRIME OR INDIVIDUAL CRIME? ENDOGENOUS SIZE OF A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION AND THE OPTIMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 661-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUIN-JEN CHANG ◽  
HUEI-CHUNG LU ◽  
MINGSHEN CHEN
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Criminal Organization ◽  
Optimal Law Enforcement

scholarly journals Risk aversion and effort under an incentive pay scheme with multiplicative noise

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikolay Zubanov
Keyword(s):  
Treatment Group ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Multiplicative Noise ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Piece Rate

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of individual risk preferences on the effectiveness of incentive pay schemes, by examining the link between individual effort and risk aversion in situations where outcome uncertainty multiplies with effort. Such “multiplicative noise” situations are common, occurring whenever payment is awarded per success rather than per attempt. Design/methodology/approach – The paper develops a theoretical model which predicts a negative risk aversion-effort link under multiplicative noise without a performance target (PT), and a weaker negative link once the target is introduced. This model is then taken to the data from a lab experiment where participants were randomly assigned to a control group, which received fixed pay, and a treatment group, which received a piece rate awarded with a certain probability, with and without a PT. Risk aversion is measured with a menu of lottery choices offered at the end of the experiment. Findings – Compared to their peers in the control group, the more risk-averse participants in the treatment group put in progressively less effort in the absence of a PT. The introduction of a PT substantially weakens this negative risk aversion-effort link, so that there are no more significant differences in performance between the more and the less risk averse. Research limitations/implications – The paper’s findings speak to the empirical puzzles of incentive pay schemes backfiring and of the proliferation of PTs. The negative risk aversion-effort link may be one reason behind the failure of incentive schemes to deliver improved performance, whereas the weakening of this link may be one justification for the existence of PTs. Practical implications – In the multiplicative noise environments, managers should take their workers’ risk preferences into account when designing incentive pay schemes. A PT may be a useful motivational tool for the risk-averse workers who are more likely to under-perform. Originality/value – The multiplicative noise environment has been largely overlooked by the existing literature, yet it is common in practice. An example is the work of a sales agent who receives a bonus per sales which succeeds with a certain probability after each customer contact. This paper is one of the first to model, and test experimentally, worker performance in this environment.

Fretting about Modest Risks Is a Mistake

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-48
Author(s):  
Matthew Rabin ◽  
Max Bazerman
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Averse

Managers often engage in risk-averse behavior, and economists, decision analysts, and managers treat risk aversion as a preference. In many cases, acting in a risk-averse manner is a mistake, but managers can correct this mistake with greater reflection. This article provides guidance on how individuals and organizations can move toward greater reflection and a more profitable aggregate portfolio of decisions. Inconsistency in risk preferences across decisions is a costly mistake for both individuals and for organizations.

scholarly journals The development of risk aversion and prudence in Chinese children and adolescents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Heinrich ◽  
Jason Shachat
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Choice Task ◽  
Chinese Children ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Chinese Children And Adolescents

AbstractThis study experimentally evaluates the risk preferences of children and adolescents living in an urban Chinese environment. We use a simple binary choice task that tests risk aversion, as well as prudence. This is the first test for prudence in children and adolescents. Our results reveal that subjects from grades 5 to 11 (10 to 17 years) make mostly risk-averse and prudent choices. The choices of 3rd graders (8 to 9 years) do not differ statistically from risk neutral benchmarks, but at the same time they make mostly prudent choices. We also find evidence for a transmission of risk preferences. There is positive correlation between all children’s and their parents’ tendency to make risk-averse choices. There is also positive correlation between girls’ and their parents’ tendency to make prudent choices.

scholarly journals Anti-social motives explain risk aversion for others in decisions from experience

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Olschewski ◽  
Marius Dietsch ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Social Motives ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risky Option

When deciding for others based on explicitly described odds and outcomes, people often havedifferent risk preferences for others than for themselves. In two pre-registered experiments, we examine risk preference for others where people learn about the odds and outcomes by experiencing them through sampling. In both experiments, on average, people were more risk averse for others than for themselves, but only when the risky option had a higher expected value. Furthermore, based on a separate set of choices, we classified people as pro- or anti- social. Only those people classified as anti-social were more risk averse for others, whereas those classified as prosocial chose similarly for themselves and others. When the uncertainty was removed, however, all participants exhibited less anti-social behavior. Together, these results suggest that anti-social motives contribute to the observed limited risk-taking for others and that outcome uncertainty facilitates the expression of these motives.

scholarly journals Discounting and Criminals’ Implied Risk Preferences

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Murat C. Mungan ◽  
Jonathan Klick
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Severity Of Punishment

AbstractConventional wisdom holds that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity of punishment. In standard law enforcement models, this assumption implies that criminals are risk seeking. We add to the existing literature by showing that offenders who discount future monetary benefits can be more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse, and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more than proportionally) with the length of the sentence.

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