Collaborative Optimization of Electric Vehicles Based on MultiAgent Variant Roth–Erev Algorithm

With the implementation of the carbon neutral policy, the number of electric vehicles (EVs) is increasing. Thus, it is urgently needed to manage the charging and discharging behavior of EVs scientifically. In this paper, EVs are regarded as agents, and a multiagent cooperative optimization scheduling model based on Roth–Erev (RE) algorithm is proposed. The charging and discharging behaviors of EVs will influence each other. The charging and discharging strategy of one EV owner will affect the choice of others. Therefore, the RE algorithm is selected to obtain the optimal charging and discharging strategy of the EV group, with the utility function of the prospect theory proposed to describe EV owners’ different risk preferences. The utility function of the prospect theory has superior effectiveness in describing consumers’ utility. Finally, in the case of residential electricity, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified. Compared with that of random charging, this method reduces the total EV group cost of EVs by 52.4%, with the load variance reduced by 26.4%.

Towards an Understanding of Low-Income Individuals’ Financial Resiliency: Exploration of Risk Preferences, Personality Traits, and Savings Behavior

The Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has helped expose and exacerbate individuals’ and households’ financial vulnerability worldwide. Meanwhile, behavioral elements affecting low-income populations’ ability to save and become more financially resilient have yet to receive sufficient academic attention. This exploratory study aims at the beginning to help elucidate the determinants of low-income individuals’ real-life savings behavior by utilizing laboratory performance measures (to characterize participants’ risk preferences by using the Balloon Analog Risk Task – BART, in study 1), as well as self-report surveys (to characterize participants’ personality traits, in study 2). Combining results from both studies, latent personality traits (i.e., attitude towards risk, perseverance, distractibility, and state anxiety) are found to affect the risk preferences of low-income individuals (captured using a novel BART performance measure indicative of an individual’s strategic risk preference adaptation), which in turn impact their ability to successfully complete matched savings programs and, thus, their ability to save and enhance their financial resilience.

Cumulative lifetime stress exposure assessed by the STRAIN predicts economic ambiguity aversion

Uncertainty is inherent in most decisions humans make. Economists distinguish between twotypes of decision-making under non-certain conditions: those involving risk (i.e., knownoutcome probabilities) and those that involve ambiguity (i.e., unknown outcome probabilities).Prior work has identified individual differences that explain risk preferences, but less is knownabout factors associated with ambiguity aversion. Here, we hypothesized that cumulativeexposure to major stressors over the lifespan might be one factor that predicts an individuals’ambiguity aversion. Across two studies (Study 1: n = 58, Mean age = 25.7; Study 2: n = 188, Mean age =39.81), we used a comprehensive lifetime stress exposure inventory (i.e., the Stress andAdversity Inventory for Adults, or STRAIN) and a standard economic approach to quantify riskand ambiguity preferences. Greater lifetime stress exposure as measured by the STRAIN,particularly in early life, was associated with higher aversion to ambiguity but not risk attitudes.

The Behavioral Agency Model and Innovation Investment: Examining the Combined Effects of CEO and Board Ownership

The Behavioral Agency Model (BAM) offers a behavioral account of executive incentives, according to which the perceived threats to CEO wealth, that is, CEO risk bearing, influence a CEO’s propensity to undertake innovation investments. While examining stock options extensively, the extant BAM research devotes relatively scant attention to other forms of incentives, such as stock ownership, that are conducive to one source of risk bearing, that is, employment risk. Furthermore, with an emphasis placed on the CEO, much BAM research neglects the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board. This study refines the BAM and empirically explores the countervailing forces exerted by the CEO and board ownership. It elucidates that while CEO ownership exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with innovation investment, board ownership weakens that relationship. An exploratory test on a sample of 108 Italian manufacturing firms provides support for the hypothesized effects. The refined BAM sheds further light on executive incentives through a behavioral lens, by elucidating the role of stock ownership and the interactive risk preferences of the CEO and the board.