The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps

Econometrica ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1541-1599 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Delegation

scholarly journals Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Kirstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Optimal Delegation

Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition

2017 ◽  
Vol 137 ◽  
pp. 54-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shungo Omiya ◽  
Yasunari Tamada ◽  
Tsung-Sheng Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Optimal Delegation

scholarly journals Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gauti B. B. Eggertsson ◽  
Eric Le Borgne
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Dynamic Incentives ◽  
Optimal Delegation

scholarly journals Opportunistic, not Optimal Delegation: The Political Origins of Central Bank Independence

2020 ◽  
pp. 001041402095767
Author(s):  
Nicole Rae Baerg ◽  
Julia Gray ◽  
Jakob Willisch
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Government ◽  
Communist Countries ◽  
Optimal Delegation ◽  
Central Bankers

Economists have long argued that central banks ran by technocrats have greater independence from the government. But in many countries, politically experienced central bankers are at the helm, including even highly independent central banks. To explain the level of central bank independence awarded, we develop a formal model where nominating politicians screen central bankers for their political ambitions. We show how screening and reelection efforts by the nominating politician changes the level of autonomy associated with different types of candidates. We predict that technocrats are associated with higher levels of independence than nominees with political experience, but as the appointing politician faces tougher reelection, candidates with political experience are associated with higher independence as well. We test our theory using new data from 29 post-communist countries between 1990 and 2012. We find evidence that the reelection strategy of the nominating politician is an important predictor of the level of central bank independence.

Strategic wage setting, inflation uncertainty and optimal delegation

2007 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105-1118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip Lawler
Keyword(s):  
Wage Setting ◽  
Inflation Uncertainty ◽  
Optimal Delegation

Optimal delegation choices in the presence of an incongruent performance measure and double moral hazard

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-424
Author(s):  
Barbara Schöndube‐Pirchegger ◽  
Jens Robert Schöndube
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
Double Moral Hazard ◽  
Optimal Delegation

How large are the gains to commitment policy and optimal delegation for New Zealand?

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 959-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirdan Lees
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Optimal Delegation

Optimal Delegation and Limited Awareness, with an Application to Financial Intermediation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah mname Auster ◽  
Nicola mname Pavoni
Keyword(s):  
Financial Intermediation ◽  
Optimal Delegation

Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

2013 ◽  
Vol 120 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-396
Author(s):  
Marcelo Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Optimal Delegation

scholarly journals Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clara Graziano ◽  
Annalisa Luporini
Keyword(s):  
Large Shareholder ◽  
Multiple Tasks ◽  
Optimal Delegation
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