The effect of central bank transparency on inflation persistence

In this paper, we examine the effect of central bank transparency on inflation persistence, using panel data analysis. The existing literature has shown a significant impact of central bank transparency on macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, but not many efforts have been made about its effect on inflation persistence. We use yearly data for 14 countries and the Eurozone (ECB). We find that monetary policy transparency has a negative statistically significant impact on inflation persistence, while controlling also for important variables such as GDP growth, interest rates, economic openness and unit labour cost.

The Central Bank Transparency Code

The paper reports to the Executive Board on its decision of April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT), which is linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI), for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT). Directors asked that the CBT should remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards, expand the transparency standards to broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis, and reorient the transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.

Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication

This chapter starts by tracing trends in central bank transparency. It reports key policy changes by some of the world’s most important central banks: the FOMC, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. The second section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on central bank design, paying close attention to the role of committee size, composition, and decision-making protocol, and classifies central banks around the world according to these features. The third section outlines the aim of central bank communications: to broadcast news and to reduce noise. The author argues that while previous literature has examined both committee design and central bank communications, it has done so in isolation. By putting these two topics together, the chapter argues that we can better understand, first, how different types of committees may be better at communicating and, second, how communication affects households’ inflation expectations and inflation.

Interaction of Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Bibliometric Analysis

This paper summarizes the arguments and counterarguments within the scientific discussion on the central bank independence and central bank transparency interaction. he main purpose of the research is to define the substantial relationships between central banks’ independence and transparency based on scientific research results. Systematization literary sources and approaches for the definition of the central bank's independence and transparency indicate that there is no generalized approach to the hierarchy of these concepts. Existing empirical studies have shown that the independence and transparency of the central bank can be interconnected components to increase the effectiveness and flexibility to solve tasks regarding the provision of currency stability and financial stability in general. Methodological tools of the research methods are Google Trends and VOSviewer instruments. The presented results of an empirical analysis of trends regarding the dynamics of the search query number by the keywords “central bank independence” and “central bank transparency” show a decrease from 2004 to the present, with a significant predominance of central bank independence over transparency throughout the study period. The results of bibliometric analysis of keyword coincidence while writing scientific articles show that researchers of the central bank independence very rarely link its solution with the transparency aspects study, while researchers of central bank transparency often study this problem in direct connection with their independence analysis. Along with this, the issues of transparency of central banks are often studied simultaneously with the analysis of their independence. The research empirically confirms and theoretically proves that the central bank’s independence is the primary category that creates the conditions for the study of its transparency. The study results provide a scientific ground to study the strength and direction of the relationship between the levels of transparency and independence of the central bank, identifying quantitative indicators to describe these relationships and can be useful for further research to ensure the central bank efficiency. Keywords: Bibliometric Analysis, Central Bank, Coincidence, Google Trends, Independence, Interaction, Transparency, VoSviewer.