Market selection in large economies: A matter of luck
Keyword(s):
In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect traders' survival and that markets can favor “lucky” traders with incorrect beliefs over “skilled” traders with accurate beliefs. My model allows for a clear distinction between luck and skills, and it shows that market selection forces induce efficient prices even when accurate traders do not survive in the long run.
The long-run impact of coups on Fiji's economy: evidence from a computable general equilibrium model
2007 ◽
Vol 19
(2)
◽
pp. 149-160
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1983 ◽
Vol 13
(1-2)
◽
pp. 21-43
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2021 ◽
Vol 11
(4)
◽
pp. 368
2021 ◽
Vol 11
(4)
◽
pp. 368