Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Author(s):  
Robert W. Kolb
2019 ◽  
pp. 127-148
Author(s):  
Alejandro E. Camacho ◽  
Robert L. Glicksman

This chapter explains how legislative changes to, and the broader commentary on, US derivatives regulation illustrate the value of parsing the overlap/distinct and centralization/decentralization dimensions in assessing the tradeoffs of regulatory allocations. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have been tasked with decentralized authority over securities and futures, respectively. Over time, their jurisdictions have increasingly overlapped as the futures and securities markets converged. Reorganization proposals and legislation to correct perceived problems with the overlapping, decentralized regulatory regime (such as Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act) have usually failed to parse the various tradeoffs between overlap and distinct or between centralized and decentralized authority. By limiting their analysis, policymakers and observers of derivatives regulation may have misdiagnosed problems with the existing allocation or missed potential opportunities to craft different regulatory configurations that might have better accommodated policy tradeoffs or been more politically viable.


Author(s):  
Jerry W. Markham

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) intensively regulates commodity futures, options, and swaps pursuant to the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal banking agencies also have some jurisdiction over derivative financial instruments. This chapter describes the CFTC regulations, including registration requirements for designated contract markets, clearinghouses, and various swap market participants. It also describes the financial responsibility requirements imposed on futures commission merchants and safeguards for customer funds in the futures markets. Additionally, the chapter addresses prohibitions against misleading sales activities, deceptive trading practices, and price manipulations. Finally, it reviews the role of the SEC and bank regulators in regulating financial derivative contracts, particularly securities derivatives and foreign currency exchange transactions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 17-21
Author(s):  
Peter Malyshev ◽  
Jennifer Achilles ◽  
Jill Ottenberg ◽  
Jessica Stumacher

Purpose This paper aims to discuss the types of cases that were brought by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 2017 and what to expect in 2018. Design/methodology/approach This paper discusses the overall statistics regarding enforcement actions brought by the CFTC, as well as the amount of restitution, disgorgement and penalties collected in 2017. These statistics are contrasted with the same statistics from 2016. This paper also discusses the types of enforcement actions brought by the CFTC in 2017 and identifies and analyzes trends. The analysis also includes a discussion of what to expect in 2018. Findings This paper concludes that 2017 was a year filled with personnel changes and vacancies at the CFTC, which resulted in no major policymaking cases being brought by the CFTC. This paper also finds that the CFTC is focused on actively monitoring the markets, and will continue to pursue actions involving reporting violations, fraud, manipulation, cryptocurrencies, and disruptive trade practices while rewarding parties for self-reporting and cooperation. Originality/value This paper contains valuable information from experienced lawyers regarding personnel changes at the CFTC, recent trends in CFTC enforcement activity and what to expect in 2018.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-73
Author(s):  
Cary Meer ◽  
Lawrence B. Patent

Purpose – To explain CFTC No-Action Letter 14-126, issued on October 15, 2014 by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, which sets forth a number of conditions with which a commodity pool operator (“CPO”) that delegates its CPO responsibilities (“Delegating CPO”) to a registered CPO (“Designated CPO”) must comply in order to take advantage of no-action relief from the requirement to register as a CPO. Design/methodology/approach – Explains the modified conditions provided by Letter 14-126, including clarification of the permissible activities in which a Delegating CPO seeking to take advantage of registration no-action relief may engage regarding investment management, solicitation, and management of pool property; lists other criteria carried over from Letter 14-69 of May 12, 2014; provides analysis and discusses limitations of the relief provided by the CFTC No-Action letter. Findings – The letter makes more liberal several of the conditions set forth in CFTC Letter 14-69 of May 12, 2014, with which many Delegating CPOs could not comply. Originality/value – Practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.


Author(s):  
Alan N. Rechtschaffen

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an independent agency with exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading in all commodities. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) set forth the first federal regulatory framework for futures trading in agricultural commodities. In 1974, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, overhauling the CEA and establishing the CFTC. When President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law, the CFTC was a natural regulatory authority for the implementation of Dodd-Frank because of its historical role in regulating a remote corner of the derivatives market place (i.e., futures). This chapter discusses the role of the CFTC, its structure, disciplinary action, and its regulatory background.


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