(Non)existent Laws of Workplace Cyberbullying

This chapter chronicles the legislative and jurisprudential history of workplace bullying and analyzes new frameworks for applying employee harassment laws to the digital era. Part I considers the sociolegal underpinnings of workplace harassment found in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The authors discuss how Title VII and its legal progeny gave way to “hostile work environment” claims. Part II discusses leading U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the creation of an affirmative defense for employers, and the limitations of that defense, including those developing in state and local jurisdictions. Part III discusses prevailing solutions and raises questions not yet addressed in the legal literature. Findings reveal that American jurisprudence is ill-set to protect or compensate workers injured by bullying—either cyber or physical.

Menstruation Discrimination and the Problem of Shadow Precedents

The burgeoning menstrual justice movement highlights that women, girls, transgender men and boys, and non-binary persons may face discrimination or harassment due to their menstruation in workplaces, schools, prisons, and many other aspects of life. In recent years, a few courts have suggested such discrimination may violate Title VII, the federal law that prohibits sex discrimination in employment. Their analysis focuses on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII passed in response to a Supreme Court case holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination. The PDA overrode the decision by explicitly defining sex as including “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” The menstruation discrimination cases thus implicate more general questions of how statutory overrides should be interpreted, a subject I’ve explored extensively in prior work. My research suggests that this nascent litigation campaign may face two distinct challenges. The first is that courts will simply deny the claims, reasoning that menstruation is not directly addressed by the text of the PDA and therefore should not be recognized as sex discrimination. The second—which is more subtle, and also perhaps more likely—is that courts could find such discrimination to be actionable, but do so relying solely on the PDA’s explicit reference to “medical conditions” related to pregnancy. While that would be helpful for addressing discrimination in workplaces, it could open the door to arguments that menstruation is outside the ambit of sex discrimination laws that were not amended in a manner analogous to how Title VII was amended. To avoid these potential risks, theorists and advocates should seek to establish that menstruation discrimination is discrimination on the basis of “sex” itself, in that it is a condition linked to female reproductive organs and associated with stereotypes about women’s inferiority. That reasoning, which suggests that the PDA is properly interpreted as signaling Congress’s disapproval with the Supreme Court’s unduly narrow understanding of what constitutes sex discrimination in the earlier pregnancy case, should apply not only to Title VII, but also to the interpretation of statutory and regulatory prohibitions on sex discrimination in non-employment contexts.

If You Build It, “They/Them” Will Come: The Misgendering of Transgender Nonbinary Athletes Is Discrimination on the Basis of Sex

This article provides necessary context to adequately engage in a discussion about transgender and nonbinary individuals, including defined terms. It then provides a brief history of Title IX, articulates the requirements for compliance with the statute, and discusses its application to transgender athletes. Next, this article provides an overview of Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the recent statutory analysis of its prohibition on employment discrimination because of sex in Bostock v. Clayton County extends that analysis to the statutory language of Title IX, and summarizes the recent interpretation by the Department of Education applying that analysis to Title IX. The article then discusses the implications of the persistent misgendering of transgender nonbinary athletes and argues that only by allowing all athletes to compete as their true gender will the inclusive goals of Title IX be realized. The article concludes that the requirements for Title IX compliance are not inclusive of transgender nonbinary athletes and contradictory to the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex articulated by the statute itself. The article proposes several necessary changes to the language of those requirements for compliance and argues that the Department of Education must make changes in its interpretation toward more inclusive language to truly achieve the goals of Title IX.

Working 9 to Non-Stop: The Fair Housing Act's Sexual Harassment Protections for Domestic, Agricultural, and Other Live-In Workers

Live-in workers, for whom their bosses are typically also their landlords, are often trapped in sexually harassing situations that feel as though they have no practical or legal redress, especially when the worker’s harasser can both fire and evict them in one fell swoop. This Note explores the novel possibility of using fair housing law, including the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and state/local fair housing statutes, as a tool to provide legal protections to workers with employer-provided housing (“live-in workers”) who experience sexual harassment or violence in the workplace. There is currently very little case law in which live-in workers have brought fair housing and employment discrimination claims simultaneously, and functionally no case law in which attorneys have brought both claims for live-in worker sexual harassment cases. This Note argues that, under existing fair housing law, many live-in workers should be eligible to bring claims under the FHA and equivalent state laws that prohibit discrimination in housing. As a result, the FHA and equivalent state claims can provide sexual harassment and assault protections for workers, including domestic workers and farmworkers, who may not receive protections under federal or state employment discrimination law. Furthermore, this Note argues that the FHA can provide supplemental or stronger protections from sexual harassment for live-in workers than traditional Title VII or employment discrimination claims. It accordingly suggests that plaintiffs facing harassment or sexual assault in live-in industries should pursue fair housing claims in addition to or in place of Title VII and employment discrimination claims, in order to achieve maximum protection and relief.