Reincarnating Al Qaeda: the global War on Terror and the ‘Arab Spring’

2014 ◽  
pp. 163-180
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome H. Kahan

Abstract Nine days after the transformational 9/11 attacks, President G.W. Bush proclaimed that the nation is fighting a Global War on Terror (GWOT), an attention-grabbing phrase designed as a rallying cry for America to win the battle against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatening our homeland as well as our allies and interests abroad. Eight years later, President Obama inherited what had become an even more dangerous situation, which led to the unexpected and courage attack that felled bin Laden and splintered al Qaeda. However, this success was short-lived when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly emerged as our primary terrorist adversary – a new and brutal threat that President Obama vowed to “degrade and ultimately destroy” by doing what it takes to win the war against this and other terrorist organizations. While there has been some progress in halting and reversing ISIS territorial gains with the US providing support to newly trained Iraqi forces, this terrorist organization is not fully contained and far from being destroyed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (53) ◽  
pp. 99-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rashmi Singh

This paper offers an analysis of the illiberal practices and discourse of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and demonstrates how the United States of America used the liberal argument as a qualitative metric of its success and failure in the GWoT. I argue that ‘the othering’ of Salafi Jihadists as well the full military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were both philosophically rooted in the liberal thinking of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, which have traditionally guided US foreign policy. More significantly, these liberal philosophies of history and international relations hold within them the seeds of illiberalism by depicting non-liberal, undemocratic societies/organisations as ‘barbaric’ – and as such prime candidates for intervention and regime change. Predicated upon this logic, the discourse of the GWoT framed Al Qaeda as a key existential threat to not only the United States but also the ‘civilised world’ in general and one which required a ‘liberal defensive war’ in response. It was the successful securitisation of Al Qaeda that essentially enabled the United States to adopt deeply illiberal policies to counter this so-called existential threat by using any means at its disposal.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candice A. Alfano ◽  
Jessica Balderas ◽  
Simon Lau ◽  
Brian E. Bunnell ◽  
Deborah C. Beidel

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abigail B. Calkin

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