Empowering work? Bargaining models reconsidered

2003 ◽  
pp. 303-319
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Models

Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Binmore ◽  
Larry Samuelson ◽  
H. Peyton Peyton Young
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Bargaining Models

Bargaining Models

Game Theory ◽  
2000 ◽  
pp. 210-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.J. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Models

scholarly journals Unfair trade underground revealed by integrating data with Nash bargaining models

2019 ◽  
Vol 222 (3) ◽  
pp. 1325-1337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teresa J. Clark ◽  
Colleen A. Friel ◽  
Emily Grman ◽  
Maren L. Friesen ◽  
Yair Shachar‐Hill
Keyword(s):  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Unfair Trade ◽  
Bargaining Models

scholarly journals Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (10) ◽  
pp. 3030-3060 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Kaas ◽  
Philipp Kircher
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms ◽  
Firm Dynamics ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Job Flows ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
The Business Cycle ◽  
Market Variables ◽  
Aggregate Dynamics

We develop and analyze a labor market model in which heterogeneous firms operate under decreasing returns and compete for labor by posting long-term contracts. Firms achieve faster growth by offering higher lifetime wages, which allows them to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with recent empirical findings. The model also captures several other regularities about firm size, job flows, and pay, and generates sluggish aggregate dynamics of labor market variables. In contrast to existing bargaining models with large firms, efficiency obtains and the model allows a tractable characterization over the business cycle. (JEL E24, J64, L11)

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