Third World Governments and Multinational Corporations: Dynamics of Host’s Bargaining Power

2002 ◽  
pp. 166-176
2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beibei Dong ◽  
Shaoming Zou ◽  
Charles R. Taylor

Multinational corporations’ (MNCs’) control over their foreign operations plays an important role in implementing their global marketing strategy. In the past, transaction cost analysis and bargaining power theory have been widely cited to explain the degree of control MNCs exert over their foreign operations. However, research explicitly combining these two perspectives has been limited. To address the gap in the literature, the authors present a joint model that combines the two alternative theories to explain MNCs’ control, and they compare their relative explanatory power. Using primary survey data, they perform an empirical test of the relative explanatory power of these two theories. The results suggest that three factors, two drawn from bargaining power theory and one from transaction cost analysis, are key factors in explaining MNCs’ degree of control over their foreign operations. The article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications.


Author(s):  
William O. Walker

This chapter assesses the various obstacles impeding the expansion of the American Century from early 1961 through 1964. Numerous problems, including Laos, Berlin, the Cuban missile crisis, and Vietnam brought into question John F. Kennedy’s leadership. His response too often minimized consultation with allies and, across the Third World, increasingly focused on security and stability through civic action programs, overseen by the Office of Public Safety in the Agency for International Development—to the great detriment, for example, of experiments like the Alliance for Progress. Meanwhile, the rise of multinational corporations and deficit-induced flight of gold thwarted Kennedy’s and Lyndon Johnson’s economic policies, while weakening America’s hegemony and credibility.


2013 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Allee ◽  
Clint Peinhardt

Although many features of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are consistent from one agreement to the next, a closer look reveals that the treaties exhibit considerable variation in terms of their enforcement provisions, which legal scholars have singled out as the central component of the treaties. An original data set is compiled that captures three important treaty-design differences: whether the parties consent in advance to international arbitration, whether they allow treaty obligations to be enforced before an institutionalized arbitration body, and how many arbitration options are specified for enforcement. Drawing upon several relevant literatures on international institutions, three potentially generalizable explanations for this important treaty variation are articulated and tested. The strongest support is found for the theoretical perspective that emphasizes the bargaining power and preferences of capital-exporting states, which use the treaties to codify strong, credible investor protections in all their treaties. Empirical tests consistently reveal that treaties contain strong enforcement provisions—in which the parties preconsent to multiple, often institutionalized arbitration options—when the capital-exporting treaty partner has considerable bargaining power and contains domestic actors that prefer such arrangements, such as large multinational corporations or right-wing governments. In contrast, there is no evidence to support the popular hands-tying explanation, which predicts that investment-seeking states with the most severe credibility problems, due to poor reputations or weak domestic institutions, will bind themselves to treaties with stronger investment protections. likewise, little support is found for explanations derived from the project on the rational design of international institutions, which discounts the identities and preferences of the treaty partners and instead emphasizes the structural conditions they jointly face. In sum, this foundational study of differences across investment treaties suggests that the design of treaties is driven by powerful states, which include elements in the treaties that serve their interests, regardless of the treaty partner or the current strategic setting.


1987 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 1103
Author(s):  
William Diebold ◽  
Charles S. Pearson

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