Moral nihilism

2010 ◽  
pp. 52-82
Keyword(s):  
1977 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-182
Author(s):  
Jesse Kalin
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May

Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven't argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes' deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such arguments are not a promising avenue for moral skeptics to take. They're ultimately weaker when applied to morality compared to perception.


1962 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanley Rothman

Perhaps no single individual has had as much impact on the discipline of political science during the past several years as has Leo Strauss of the University of Chicago. Both he and his disciples (and they are disciples in the “classical” sense) have engaged in a full scale attack upon the premises underlying the contemporary study of politics.Strauss argues that these premises are illfounded and self-contradictory, and, if taken seriously, lead to moral nihilism. He contends, further, that another set of premises, those of “classical natural right,” which treat man in terms of his natural end and his relation to the “mysterious whole,” are capable of providing a more adequate foundation for the study of politics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pölzler

1974 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-90
Author(s):  
Neil Cooper
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document