Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

How Moral Expectancy Violations Influence Audiences’ Affective Dispositions Toward Characters

Affective disposition theory (ADT) explains that the moral judgments of character behavior inform dispositions toward characters. These dispositions bias moral judgments of characters’ subsequent behaviors and establish behavioral expectations. We used expectancy violations theory to help specify people’s dispositions toward characters. In study 1, we modified the footbridge dilemma to develop experimental stimuli and predictions. Studies 2 and 3 observed the disposition formation process longitudinally and validated our stimulus: a custom-built visual novel. Study 4 tested our predictions. Studies 2 through 4 used pre-registered hypotheses, sampling, and data analyses. Results demonstrated that the current disposition (positive vs. negative) changes how a novel (im)moral behavior affects that disposition. Schema-violating behaviors provoked larger mean differences in participants’ dispositions toward protagonists compared to antagonists. Specifically, people were hyper-scrutinous of moral paragons and entrenched despised characters in moral skepticism. Additionally, we observed differences in dispositions toward characters who did not act when they could (inaction).

A REPLY TO RONALD DWORKIN’S CRITIQUE OF MORAL SKEPTICISM

This paper focuses on “indeterminacy”, “objectivity” and “truth” in the work of Ronald Dworkin. The text is divided into four parts: first, I will expose the general structure of Dworkin’s conception of objectivity in the moral domain (Section 1). Next, I will present the main critiques Dworkin addresses to two of his most important philosophical enemies, namely the “external skeptic” (Section 2.1) and the “internal skeptic” (Section 2.2). I then intend to address Dworkin’s critiques by presenting counterarguments in defense of moral skepticism (Section 3). In order to clarify the debate and its points, I try to illustrate the arguments with examples whenever possible. In the concluding Section (4), I recapitulate the main points of the text.

Moral Skepticism

This chapter has three aims. The first is to give the reader an overview of Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, focusing on the transitions that link the book’s three sections. The second aim is to understand Kant’s argument in Groundwork III, focusing on his claim that the moral ‘ought’ has its source in our own ‘will.’ This argument is shown to address, not a theoretical form of doubt, but a practical problem of despair that Kant identifies with our tendency to rationalize against moral laws. A further aim of this chapter is to clarify Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic paths as a framework for understanding his project of moral justification.

‘A presumption of trust’ in international society

This article reflects on Nicholas J. Rengger’s 1997 article in International Affairs on ‘The ethics of trust in world politics’. The article has received comparably little attention, which is a shame because as I explore in my contribution it remains two decades on a highly important intervention in the on-going debate over the possibilities for developing and sustaining trust in an anarchic international system. Rengger argued that international cooperation, and the idea of international society it rests on, cannot be sustained in the absence of what he called ‘a presumption of trust’. However, he viewed this presumption in late modernity as an increasingly fragile one, and whilst he offered some ways to shore up the crumbling foundation of trust, his moral skepticism as to the possibilities of realising this run through his thinking. Rengger’s concern was that as the practices that ‘ground’ trust erode, cooperation will come to depend solely on rational egoist, interest-based calculations, and that such a basis is unstable and prone to breakdown. The problem that Rengger identified of how to ground authoritative practices of trust in international society remains an urgent one at a time when great power relations are characterised by increasing distrust. Having engaged with some of his key arguments in the article, I end by briefly identifying three problems that his essay would have benefited from considering further. These are (1) the relationship between trust and trustworthiness; (2) the neglect of security community theory; and (3) the potential of ‘godparenting’ (a concept Rengger borrows and develops from the moral philosopher Annette Baier) in international relations.

Natural Law and the Chair of Ethics in the University of Naples, 1703–1769

This articles focuses on a significant change to the curriculum in “ethics” (moral philosophy) in the University of Naples, superintended by Celestino Galiani, the rector of the university (1732–53), and Antonio Genovesi, Galiani's protégé and the university's professor of ethics (1746–54). The article contends that Galiani's and Genovesi's sympathies lay with the form of “modern natural law” pioneered by Hugo Grotius and his followers in Northern Europe. The transformation of curricular ethics in Protestant contexts had stemmed from an anxiety about its relevance in the face of moral skepticism. The article shows how this anxiety affected a Catholic context, and it responds to John Robertson's contention that Giambattista Vico's use of “sacred history” in his Scienza nuova (1725, revised 1730, 1744) typified a search among Catholics for an alternative to “scholastic natural law,” when the latter was found insufficiently to explain the sources of human sociability.