Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism

May (2013) argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter the implausibility thesis). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that pace May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an issue for the moral skeptic; she has an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. Thus, we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis.

Moral Universality and Moral Nihilism: on the Meanings of the Contemporary Revaluation of Values

Modern thought is characterized by the attention to the revaluation of values. The idea of the absence of a single transcultural ethical “code” is given a moral meaning: it is seen as a condition for a dialogue that overcomes the repressive intentions of enlightenment univer­salism. This article examines the role of the moral universality idea in the formation of two types of moral nihilism that are significant for modern culture: a) first-order nihilism that re­jects the universality of specific moral concepts and b) second-order nihilism that rejects the universality of a pure moral law. In first-order nihilism, the appeal to the universality of duty serves as a means of overthrowing the universalist claims of prevailing morality. In second-order nihilism, the essential conflict in the structure of the idea of universality ends with the denial of the universality of duty. It is shown that a significant number of modern culture practices are determined by nihilism of the second order. The origins of this type of nihilism are investigated. We prove its connection with the ethical system of Kant, and, at the same time, with the will-to-power ethics of Nietzsche. The transition from Kant’s idea of universal duty to the denial of the universality of duty by Dostoevsky’s heroes is be­ing reconstructed. The analysis suggests that optimistic interpretations of the current plural situation are not justified. Without connecting the idea of universality to the idea of the ab­soluteness of moral requirements, the idea of a plurality of moral worlds leads not to a “dia­logue of different origins”, but to the gnostic construction of “multi-store humanity”.

Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism

This paper explores how hinge epistemology (specifically, Duncan Pritchard’s brand of hinge epistemology) might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific (or ‘local’) skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I then suggest that there are hinge commitments in the moral domain, and use this to address a moral skeptical problem due to our apparent inability to know moral nihilism to be false.

Nihilism

As its name implies (from Latin nihil, ‘nothing’), philosophical nihilism is a philosophy of negation, rejection, or denial of some or all aspects of thought or life. Moral nihilism, for example, rejects any possibility of justifying or criticizing moral judgments, on grounds such as that morality is a cloak for egoistic self-seeking, and therefore a sham; that only descriptive claims can be rationally adjudicated and that moral (prescriptive) claims cannot be logically derived from descriptive ones; or that moral principles are nothing more than expressions of subjective choices, preferences or feelings of people who endorse them. Similarly, epistemological nihilism denies the possibility of justifying or criticizing claims to knowledge, because it assumes that a foundation of infallible, universal truths would be required for such assessments, and no such thing is available; because it views all claims to knowledge as entirely relative to historical epochs, cultural contexts or the vagaries of individual thought and experience, and therefore as ultimately arbitrary and incommensurable; because it sees all attempts at justification or criticism as useless, given centuries of unresolved disagreement about disputed basic beliefs even among the most intelligent thinkers; or because it notes that numerous widely accepted, unquestioned beliefs of the past are dismissed out of hand today and expects a similar fate in the future for many, if not all, of the most confident present beliefs. Political nihilism calls for the complete destruction of existing political institutions, along with their supporting outlooks and social structures, but has no positive message of what should be put in their place. Cosmic nihilism regards nature as either wholly unintelligible and starkly indifferent to basic human concerns, or as knowable only in the sense of being amenable to scientific description and explanation. In either case, the cosmos is seen as giving no support to distinctively human aims or values, and it may even be regarded as actively hostile to human beings. Existential nihilism negates the meaning of human life, judging it to be irremediably pointless, futile and absurd. Cosmic and existential nihilism are the focus of this entry.

Handlingens logik

Alenka Zupančič’ work on Immanuel Kant (Ethics of the Real, 2000) marks her entrance onto the international philosophical scene and places her among the three giants of contemporary Slovenien philosophy. In this article, Zupančič’ investigation of Kantian ethics is presented with a particular focus on the so called ‘logic of the act’, which Zupančič claims has been forgotten or repressed in recent Kant scholarship. By reading Kant with Lacan and showing how any act worthy of the name has a characteristic similar to Lacan’s concept of the drive, Zupančič brings forward a new, much more radical and a bit scary Kant – one that also represents a way of overcoming the moral nihilism of contemporary society.

Usulan a. Macintyre Kembali ke Etika Keutamaan : Sebuah Solusi atau Nostalgia Belaka?

<p><strong>Abtract :</strong> As an alternative to the impasse of the modern-enlightenment project in ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests to recourse to virtue-ethics. This article will present first, what MacIntyre means by the modern-enlightenment project in ethics, secondly, his critique of that project, especially his arguments why such ethics is bound to fail. Thirdly, why, according to him, developing virtue-ethics, somewhat like the Aristotelian-Thomistic model, will provide a solution to the impasse. Finally, I would like to make a short evaluation of MacIntyre’s suggestion by focusing on the question whether his suggestion to recourse to virtue-ethics is just a nostalgia to the past as criticized by Ross Poole. I will argue in this article that, despite MacIntyre’s failure to give concrete examples of good modern ethical communities that live out his model of virtue-ethics, as Poole has rightly pointed out, as long as human being can still agree on certain basic human values upon which global ethics of virtue can be built, MacIntyre’s suggestion is not simply a nostalgic recourse to the past as Ross Poole believes. MacIntyre’s recourse to virtue-ethics can indeed provide solution to overcome the danger of moral nihilism looming over the modern-enlightenment project and it can also provide reasonable ground for living ethically.</p><p><em>Keywords : Ethics of virtue, Modern-enlightenment project, Nostalgia, Solution, Rational ground, Nihilism.</em></p><p> </p><p><strong>Abstrak :</strong> Sebagai usulan guna mengatasi kegagalan di bidang etika proyek modern-pencerahan, Alasdair MacIntyre menawarkan ajakan untuk kembali ke etika keutamaan. Tulisan ini pertama-tama bermaksud menjelaskan apa yang ia maksudkan dengan proyek<strong></strong> modern-perncerahan, khususnya di bidang etika dan mengapa proyek seperti itu, menurut MacIntyre, niscaya gagal. Kemudian akan dikaji mengapa baginya membuat langkah kembali ke etika keutamaan model Aristoteles dan Thomas Aquinas akan dapat mengatasi kegagalan tersebut. Akhirnya, sebuah evaluasi singkat terhadap usulan MacIntyre akan diberikan. Dalam artikel ini akan ditunjukkan bahwa, lepas dari kegagalan MacIntyre untuk memberikan contoh kongkret komunitas etis modern yang mengayati etika keutamaan yang ia cita-citakan, sebagaimana telah dengan tepat ditunjukkan oleh Poole, asalkan umat manusia, sampai batas tertentu, masih dapat menyepakati adanya nilai-nilai dasar kemanusiaan atas dasar mana sebuah etika keutamaan yang berisfat global dapat dibangun, usulan MacIntyre untuk kembali ke etika keutamaan, bukanlah sekedar suatu bentuk nostalgia ke masa lalu seperti dikemukakan oleh Ross Poole dalam kritiknya. Usulan itu sesungguhnya memang dapat memberi jalan keluar mengatasi bahaya nihilisme moral yang membayangi proyek etika modern-pencerahan serta dapat memberi dasar yang masuk akal untuk hidup secara etis.</p><em>Kata Kunci : Etika keutamaan, Proyek pencerahan modern, Nostalgia, Solusi, Landasan rasional, Nihilisme.</em>