The guise of the good

Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-123
Author(s):  
John D. Fair

Uneasily situated between counterculture images projected by James Dean in Rebel Without a Cause (1955) and the dawning of the “Age of Aquarius” a decade later, there emerged a motion picture interlude of innocence on the beaches of Southern California. It was fostered by Gidget (1959) and then thirty “surf and sex” movies that focused on young, attractive bodies and beach escapades rather than serious social causes.The films, argues Kirse May, “created an ideal teenage existence, marked by consumption, leisure, and little else.” Stephen Tropiano explains how their popularity helped shape “the archetypal image of the American teenager” and, reinforced by the surfin' sounds of Jan and Dean, the Beach Boys, and other recording groups, “turned America's attention to the Southern California coastline,” where “those who never set foot on its sandy shores were led to believe that life on the West Coast was a twenty-four-hour beach party.” This study examines a notable film of this genre to determine how musclemen were exploited to exhibit this playful spirit and how their negative reception reinforced an existing disregard toward physical culture. Muscle Beach Party illustrates how physical culture served other agendas, namely the need to address American fears of juvenile delinquency and to revive sagging box-office receipts within the guise of the “good life” of California.


2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Francesco Orsi
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 714-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Orsi
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Boswell

According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for, on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good. This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does not suffice to make the action intelligible. In this paper, I show that this objection has bite only because the Guise of the Good’s theory of intelligibility has yet seen little sustained articulation. Properly understood, this theory holds that an action is intelligible to an agent only if it appears to them to possess some substantive evaluative property. I then argue that this response to the objection has a significant implication for contemporary Guise of the Good theories, for it shows that the currently ascendant version of the theory, the attitudinal theory, cannot avail itself of the intelligibility motivation.


Jurisprudence ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-142
Author(s):  
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco

Author(s):  
Katerina Deligiorgi

Hegel’s criticism of morality, or Moralität, has had a decisive influence in the reception of his thought. By general acknowledgment, while his writings support a broadly neo-Aristotelian ethics of self-actualization, his views on moral philosophy are exhausted by his criticisms of Kant, whom he treats as paradigmatic exponent of the standpoint of morality. The aim of this chapter is to correct this received view and show that Hegel offers a positive conception of moral willing. The main argument is presented in two parts: (a) an interpretation of the ‘Morality’ section of the Philosophy of Right that shows Hegel defending a guise of the good version of willing; and (b) an examination of problems raised by this view of willing, some of which are anticipated by Hegel in in his treatment of the ‘Idea of the Good’ in the Logic, and of the interpretative options available to deal with these problems.


2021 ◽  
pp. 113-129
Author(s):  
Alex Gregory

The chapter starts by contrasting desire-as-belief with the idea that there are ‘besires’. On a natural understanding of that view, desire-as-belief is the superior theory, being more parsimonious and more in keeping with common sense. The chapter then addresses the guise of the good: the view that we only desire things if we believe them to be good. The guise of the good faces various counterexamples, cannot permit that different people can correctly desire different things, and makes poor sense of the contrast between wanting, wishing, and hoping. But these problems can be avoided if we treat desires as beliefs about reasons.


2021 ◽  
pp. 153-165
Author(s):  
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen

The main aim in ‘FA and Motivating Reasons’ is to clear the ground for the discussion in Chapter 11 by drawing attention to some notions and distinctions that help us to understand the core elements of fitting-attitude analysis (FA). In particular, the distinction between explanatory and motivating reason plays a core part in this and the next chapter. In light of this distinction, the focus is on whether we should accept either ‘the guise of the good thesis’ or the more plausible ‘guise of reason thesis’. Eventually (in Chapter 11), it is argued that we should endorse neither of these. While the previous chapters gave us a positive insight (they lead to a modification of the FA pattern of analysis), this—and the next chapter also, as we shall see—will mainly have a negative impact. It suggests we should refrain from introducing certain modifications of FA analysis that at first sight might seem compelling.


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