The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movements

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-51
Author(s):  
S. Neil MacFarlane
2021 ◽  
pp. 51-70
Author(s):  
Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk

The article deals with the foreign policy aspects in the ideological concept of Stepan Bandera’s Organisation of Ukrainian Nationatists (OUN-B) during the period from the change of position and balance of forces in the Eastern Front of World War II in 1943 and its transformation during the following postwar decades until the eve of the restoration of Ukraine’s independence. The author examines the OUN’s geopolitical calculations for an armed confrontation between the USSR, on the one hand, and the allied United States and Great Britain, on the other; the beginning of the search for ways of the organisation’s cooperation with Western democracies; its attitude to the threat of a nuclear war, etc. Also analysed is the OUN-B leadership’s vision of the geostrategic place of the future Ukrainian state in the international arena and, in particular, in the post-Soviet space and on the map of Central and Eastern Europe. The article sheds light on the vision of the role and place of independent Ukraine in international politics, particularly with respect to possible military and political blocs, Ukraine’s role in the United Nations, its attitude to the prospect of united Europe, the war in Afghanistan, national liberation movements and the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the restoration of Ukraine’s state independence, and its place in the post-Soviet and European space. By way of conclusion, the author argues that the Cold War turned out to be helpful in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and allowed Ukraine to restore its national independence in 1991. Nonetheless, the modern national security agenda of Ukraine and the need for the world’s peace and balance necessitate curbing the imperialist, bellicose, and culpably terrorist actions and intents of Russia, the successor of the USSR. Keywords: OUN-B, Cold War, geopolitics, national liberation movements.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mao Lin

This article reexamines how concerns about China contributed to the escalation of the Vietnam War during the first years of Lyndon Johnson's administration. Johnson escalated the war in Vietnam to protect America's global credibility as the leader and defender of the non-Communist world in the face of the threat posed by China's “wars of national liberation” strategy in Vietnam. U.S. officials evaluated this threat in the context of the broadening Sino-Soviet split. The concern in Washington was that if Hanoi, a regime openly supported by Beijing as a star in the “wars of national liberation,” were to take over South Vietnam, the Soviet Union might then be forced to discard the “peaceful coexistence” principle and the incipient détente with the West. The escalation in Vietnam was spurred largely by apprehension that a failure to contain China in Vietnam might prompt the Soviet Union to shift back to a hard line toward the West.


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