The centralization vs decentralization tug of war and the emerging narrative of fiscal federalism for social policy in India

2019 ◽

Vol 35 (1) ◽

pp. 1-4 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Daniel Béland ◽

Alex Waddan

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Social Policy ◽

Fiscal Federalism ◽

Policy Design ◽

The United States ◽

Special Issue ◽

National Differences ◽

Key Characteristics ◽

Family Benefits ◽

International Social

AbstractThere is a vast social policy literature on how Canada and the United States share key characteristics associated with the liberal welfare regime such as significant reliance on both social assistance and tax-subsidized private benefits and services. Yet, a closer look at these two countries points to key differences in areas such as fiscal federalism, health care, old-age pensions, and family benefits. This special issue of the Journal of Comparative and International Social Policy looks at recent social policy developments in Canada and the United States in ways that further illustrate the broad similarities, but also the key cross-national differences in policy design and real-world consequences, between these two countries. This Introduction explains why Canada and the United States are “unidentical twins” in social policy before discussing the contributions comprising this special issue.

Download Full-text

The centralization vs decentralization tug of war and the emerging narrative of fiscal federalism for social policy in India

Regional & Federal Studies ◽

10.1080/13597566.2018.1511978 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 29 (2) ◽

pp. 187-217 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Yamini Aiyar ◽

Avani Kapur

Keyword(s):

Social Policy ◽

Fiscal Federalism

Download Full-text

Is a Uniform Social Policy Better? Fiscal Federalism and Factor Mobility

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.91.3.596 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 91 (3) ◽

pp. 596-610 ◽

Cited By ~ 13

Author(s):

Roberto Perotti

Keyword(s):

Social Policy ◽

Labor Markets ◽

Majority Rule ◽

Fiscal Federalism ◽

Productive Efficiency ◽

Factor Mobility

This paper develops a two-country model to study two questions. How do the degrees of centralization of redistribution and of factor mobility affect the productive efficiency of the economies? What degrees of centralization of redistribution and of factor mobility are likely to be chosen by majority rule? The model shows that a system of centralized redistribution can lead to less efficient outcomes if labor or capital are not mobile; and an inefficient outcome, with incomplete or no factor mobility, receives a majority of votes in both countries, whenever the structure of labor markets is very different in the two countries. (JEL D72, E62, H50, H77)

Download Full-text