Enterprise Governance

Author(s):  
Venkatesh Upadrista
2006 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell D. Lansbury ◽  
Chris F. Wright ◽  
Marian Baird

This paper examines the impact of enterprise bargaining on employment relations practices in the Australia automotive assembly sector in the context of the globalization of the industry. While there has been convergence towards lean production principles among the four auto assemblers, arising from global trends, there has also been divergence resulting from enterprise bargaining, among other variables. Strong similarities are apparent between the companies in areas such as work organization, skill formation and enterprise governance, whereas there are differences in remuneration and staffing practices. However, it remains to be seen whether decentralized bargaining will continue to yield greater differentiation in employment relations among the automotive manufacturers in an increasingly globalized industry.


Author(s):  
Charles B. Keating ◽  
Polinpapilinho F. Katina

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey

Why do shareholders monopolise voting rights in UK companies, and are trade unions the only way to get meaningful workplace representation? In 1967 a Labour Party policy document first coined the phrase that a ‘single channel’ for representation should ‘in the normal’ case mean trade unions. Since then, it has been said the labour movement embraced an ‘adversarial’ rather than a ‘constitutional’ conception of corporations, neglecting legal rights to worker voice in enterprise governance. This article shows that matters were not so simple. It explains the substantial history of legal rights to vote in British workplaces, and competition from the rival constitutional conception: employee share schemes. The UK has the oldest corporations – namely universities – which have consistently embedded worker participation rights in law. Britain has among the world’s most sophisticated ‘second channel’ participation rights in pension board governance. Developing with collective bargaining, it had the world’s first private corporations with legal participation rights. Although major plans in the 1920s for codetermination in rail and coal fell through, it maintained a ‘third channel’ of worker representatives on boards during the 20th century in numerous sectors, including ports, gas, post, steel, and buses. At different points every major political party had general proposals for votes at work. The narrative of the ‘single channel’ of workplace representation, and an ‘adversarial’ conception of the company contains some truth, but there has never been one size of regulation for all forms of enterprise. (2018) 47(1) Industrial Law Journal 76.


Author(s):  
Steven De Haes ◽  
Wim Van Grembergen

Enterprise governance of IT (EGIT) is about the definition and implementation of processes, structures and relational mechanisms that enable both business and IT people to execute their responsibilities in support of business/IT alignment and the creation of business value from IT-enabled business investments. In this field, practice-oriented guidance like COBIT and Val IT are often promoted as broad frameworks to implement enterprise governance of IT, but very little academic research is available that empirically supports the assumption that implementing EGIT practices, as defined by COBIT and Val IT, improve business performance. This article explores the relationship between Enterprise Governance of IT practices and business performance, and finds little support to identify a direct link between EGIT practices and business performance. However, clear empirical evidence is revealed demonstrating that the implementation of EGIT practices impacts the achievement of specific IT goals, which in turn impacts the achievement of specific business goals. A three-layered cascade is proposed to demonstrate the impact of EGIT practices, through IT goals, on business performance.


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