Integrated Transport Policy: Implications for Regulation and Competition The July 1998 Transport White Paper and the 1998 Competition Act

2018 ◽  
pp. 155-178
Energy Policy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 115 ◽  
pp. 109-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoda Talebian ◽  
Omar E. Herrera ◽  
Martino Tran ◽  
Walter Mérida

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mercedes Burguillo ◽  
Pablo del Río ◽  
Desiderio Romero Jordán

1974 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Harbeson

1992 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-604
Author(s):  
Allison Heisch

On the morning of 8 February 1587 (n.s.) Mary Stuart was executed at Fotheringay Castle in Northampton for her complicity in the Babington Plot—the last of the great conspiracies to assassinate Queen Elizabeth I and to place her distant cousin Mary on the English throne in order to re-establish England as a Catholic state. Particularly because of remarks Queen Elizabeth allegedly made to William Davison, to whom the execution warrant was entrusted, nearly every modern historian who has written about the trial and death of Mary Stuart has speculated about the possibility that Queen Elizabeth, particularly in the days immediately preceding Mary's beheading, considered assassination of her cousin as a politic alternative to the axe. Although Elizabeth's chief councillor, Lord Burghley, wished to proceed with what (at least publicly) he regarded as a legal activity, it has not been at all points clear how he was able to persuade the queen to take the steps necessary to accomplish the execution; because Mary was her relative, because she was female, because the doctrine of Divine Right of Kings (to which Elizabeth frequently resorted as proof of her own authority) specified that monarchs were subject to God's judgment alone (and not civil law), and finally, because of the foreign policy implications of executing a woman who was French, Queen of Scotland, near heir to the English throne, and a devout Catholic, Elizabeth hesitated to proceed.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-520
Author(s):  
Rosa Greaves

In 2001 the European Commission (‘the Commission’) published a long-expected White Paper entitled ‘European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide’1 where it set out its vision for the transport industry for the immediate future. In the section dealing with the enlarged Europe and the globalisation of transport the Commission noted that:


2019 ◽  
pp. 153-176
Author(s):  
Phil Goodwin

Traffic forecasting developed initially to decide how much road capacity to provide, but early methods tended to underestimate the growth. The methods were changed but then from the late 1980s systematically overestimated traffic growth, distorting the appraisal of benefits, and transforming the policy implications: it became evident that no feasible road capacity expansion would be enough to cope with the forecast traffic, and it would be necessary to manage demand instead. Since 2015 the official forecasts have sensibly avoided specifying a ‘most probable’ future, replacing it with a variety of different possibilities from almost no growth to exceedingly high. This creates a framework for a much more useful type of policy appraisal, though practical road proposals mostly still confidently assert high traffic growth at levels which have not been seen for over 25 years.


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