Feminist Philosophy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elinor Mason
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Lisa Heldke

John Dewey’s record as a feminist and an advocate of women is mixed. He valued women intellectual associates whose influences he acknowledged, but did not develop theoretical articulations of the reasons for women’s subordination and marginalization. Given his mixed record, this chapter asks, how useful is Dewey’s work as a resource for feminist philosophy? It begins with a survey of the intellectual influences that connect Dewey with a set of women family members, colleagues, and students. It then discusses Dewey’s influence on the work of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century pragmatist feminist philosophers. Dewey’s influence has been strongest in the fields of feminist epistemology, philosophy of education, and social and political philosophy. Although pragmatist feminist philosophy remains a small field within feminist philosophy, this chapter argues that its conceptual resources could be put to further good use, particularly in feminist metaphysics, epistemology, and value theory.


1983 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 13-14
Author(s):  
Leta A. Moniz

Integrating Women's Studies with any curriculum, political science or otherwise, is a formidable task. And like most changes in curriculum, the integration of Women's Studies material has not come about in orderly fashion. There are some dimensions to Women's Studies integration, however, that set it apart from other curriculum change.The thrust of Women's Studies vis a vis any discipline is to revise and reinterpret that discipline from a feminist perspective. Feminist philosophy has argued that traditional methodologies, theories, and manifest analyses have contained a patriarchal bias which has excluded the impact of women from the intellectual evolution of humankind. Thus, on the discipline and on the academy itself, the very premise of Women's Studies makes demands which are far-reaching and threatening to establishment doctrine.


Hypatia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-328
Author(s):  
Asaf Angermann

Gillian Rose (1947–1995) was an influential though idiosyncratic British philosopher whose work helped introduce the Frankfurt School's critical theory and renew interest in Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Jewish thought in Anglo‐American philosophy. After years of relative oblivion, her life and thought have recently received new attention in philosophy, sociology, and theology. However, her work's critical Hegelian contribution to feminist philosophy still remains unexplored. This article seeks to reassess the place and the meaning of feminism and gender identity in Rose's work by addressing both her philosophical writings and her personal memoir, written in the months preceding her untimely death. It argues that although Rose's overall work was not developed in a feminist context, her philosophy, and in particular her ethical‐political notion of diremption, is valuable for developing a critical feminist philosophy that overcomes the binaries of law and morality, inclusion and exclusion, power and powerlessness—and focuses on the meaning of love as negotiating, rather than mediating, these oppositions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 469-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beverley Clough

This article engages with emerging debates in law and feminist philosophy around the concept of vulnerability. Central to this is the call to re-imagine and re-frame vulnerability as universal – as something which is experienced by all individuals, by virtue of their humanity and context as social beings. The implications of this for laws and policies predicated on groups or categories as ‘being vulnerable’ will be explored in this article, using the concept of mental capacity as an example of how the boundary between capacity and incapacity can be contested through this lens. The article will critically consider the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and associated literature, such as Court of Protection cases, the House of Lords Select Committee's post-legislative scrutiny and Serious Case Reviews, which demonstrate the growing concern about the inadequacy of the binary between capacity and incapacity. This in turn provokes a challenge to accepted wisdom in the context of disability more broadly, inviting us to think in particular about the responses to perceived vulnerability that are currently deemed appropriate. Insights from the legal literature invite further exchanges with social policy theorists as to the concept of vulnerability and its challenges and implications for law and policy.


Signs ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-251 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heisook Kim

Signs ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana María Bach
Keyword(s):  

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