The Anti-Representational Paradigm of Richard Rorty Regarding the Concept of “Language”

The article considers the anti-representational paradigm regarding the concept of “language” presented by the American thinker, the founder of neopragmatism, Richard Rorty. Richard Rorty is the most cited philosopher in the Western philosophical community, the popularity of the texts of the American thinker, and the resonance of his ideas in the modern philosophical community are of great interest and discussion. The relevance of the topic in the context of postmodern society is dictated by the fact that modern American philosophy, in particular, neopragmatism and the concept of “language”, are insufficiently studied and covered in Ukrainian philosophical studies. The purpose of the article is to update the discussions about the philosophical tradition of neopragmatism by Richard Rorty regarding the concept of “language”. The research methods of the study are comparative analysis and descriptive reconstruction. In the course of the study, the following provisions of the philosophy of Richard Rorty have been analyzed: criticism of the epistemilogization of the discourse of philosophy; analysis of the main provisions of neopragmatism, in particular, the theory of truth and anti-representational paradigm regarding the concept of “language” as the basic concepts of human culture.The analysis of the specifics of the formulation and understanding of the main philosophical ideas in R. Rorty’s neopragmatic theory of knowledge allows approaching their analysis unconventionally, which does not refute, but complements and deepens the classical concepts, allowing them to be fruitfully applied to solving problems of specific sciences.

Epistemological resistances and the search for alternatives to modernity in intellectual history

The violence of modernity has led to epistemological resistances around the world and the search for alternative ways of reconstructing philosophy. Among the Frankfurt School and early Kyoto School thinkers, for instance, the problem of modernity is framed as an excess of objective rationality, but among the decolonial thinkers of Latin America, the problem is conceptualized as the very myth of modernity itself that has legitimized the colonization and exclusion of non-Europeans. In the search for alternatives modernities, the Kyoto School and Latin American philosophy agree to a vision of inter-civilizational dialogue, which amounts to an engagement of alterity or differences, whereas with the Frankfurt School, albeit struggles to find consensus on how to overcome modernity, aims to merely preclude the problem of reproducing the impulses toward the domination of oneself and others. Nonetheless, all these paradigms have a theoretical point of convergence: that is, since we are all participants of modernity, we are both victims and executioners of its violence, and thus compelled to negate it. This article will discuss how the violence of modernity is experienced, theorized, and then challenged around different continents in order to make visible not just how the violence of modernity is reproduced in different ways but to force ourselves to engage in self-critique in the pursuit to make explicit our own assumptions that repeats the violence of modernity.

Monism and the Religion of Science

Monism was not just a philosophical outlook, but also an early twentieth-century new religious movement. Founded by the internationally renowned evolutionary theorist Ernst Haeckel, it was supposed to be a “Religion of Science” that repudiated matter-mind dualism in favor of reverence for a divinized Mother Nature. This article traces the genesis of the German Monist League and how it was transplanted to the United States by the publisher, Paul Carus. Although readers of this journal are likely to know about new religions that embrace “pseudoscience,” the surprise is that Monism had followers with significant scientific renown including multiple Nobel Prize-winning scientists, famous philosophers of science, and even a celebrated sociologist. Scholars of secularism or science and religion will want to know about how Haeckel and his followers constructed a hybrid Scientific Faith or Secular Church that this article demonstrates went on to provide the foundation for professionalizing American philosophy.

Conclusion

In this Conclusion, the author summarizes the main features of his theory of epistemic rationality and explains how his theory avoids commitment to any of the five presuppositions of the Proof Paradigm. He explains his new solution to the epistemological version of Berkeley’s puzzle. He recaps the real-world epistemological issues addressed by his theory. He concludes with some final thoughts, including a call to philosophers to reject both the presuppositions of the Proof Paradigm and the narrow scientism that characterizes so much of contemporary American philosophy. He urges us to replace that narrow scientism with a more expansive understanding of the human mind that can make sense of its “unreasonable effectiveness” in scientific and other inquiry.

Internal and External Validity in Ethical Reasoning

A particular approach to ethical reasoning has come to dominate much Anglo-American philosophy, one which assumes that the most rigorous method is to proceed by analysis of thought experiments. In thought experiments, features such as context and history are stripped away, and all factors other than those of ethical interest are stipulated to be equal. This chapter argues that even if a thought experiment produces results that are internally valid—in that it provides a genuine ethical insight about the highly controlled and simplified experimental scenario under discussion—this does not imply external validity. Just as in empirical experiments, there is a yawning gap between succeeding in the relatively easy project of establishing internal validity in a controlled and simplified context, and the more difficult one of establishing external validity in the messier and more complex real world.

C. I. Lewis

Clarence Irving Lewis (b. 1883–d. 1964) is arguably the most important philosopher bridging the pragmatism of the golden age of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce and the analytic quasi-pragmatism of philosophers like W. V. Quine, Nelson Goodman, Wilfrid Sellars, and Hilary Putnam (the first three of whom were taught by him). Lewis’s philosophy as a whole reveals a unified systematic development from his dissertation in 1910, his early work in logic, the development of his epistemology in the 1920s and 1930s, his account of value theory in the 1940s and 1950s, culminating in his work in ethics, which occupied him until his death. Along the way he offered a devastating critique of American absolute idealism and offered a rich epistemology grounded in a Peircean kind of pragmatism. Early in his career Lewis wrote the first the history of logic in English, and, critical of the paradoxes of material implication, he developed an account of strict implication and a set of successively stronger modal logics, the S systems becoming the father of modern modal logic. Lewis was the most influential American philosopher from the mid-1930s until after his retirement in the 1950s. His work helped shape American philosophy as an academic endeavor and contributor to the growing acceptance of rigorous philosophical analysis and European logical empiricism. Lewis spent practically his entire career at Harvard University, bridging the Harvard of James and Royce and the modern department of Quine and Goodman. During his career he wrote six books and a hundred or so papers and reviews. A student of Josiah Royce, William James, and Ralph Barton Perry, a contemporary of Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap, and the logical empiricists of the 1930s and 1940s, and the teacher of Quine, William Frankena, Goodman, Roderick Chisholm, Roderick Firth, Sellars, and others, he played a pivotal role in shaping the marriage between pragmatism and empiricism that has come to dominate much of current analytic philosophy. Despite his significant contributions, his work soon became neglected and misinterpreted, lost in the influx of interest in Wittgenstein and the philosophy of language. Fortunately, this neglect has begun to wane.

Philosophy of Boredom

Even the most cursory of glances at the history of boredom reveals that boredom has been a topic of immense discussion. That same glance also reveals that there is not just one kind of boredom. There is the fastidium of Seneca, the horror loci of Lucretius, and the religious boredom of acedia. There is the sadness and listlessness of tristesse and melancholy, the void of Pascal, and the emptiness of La Rochefoucauld and of 18th-century Versailles. There is the ennui of Mme Du Deffand, of Chateubriand’s René, and of Goethe’s Werther. There is the despair of Schopenhauer, the monotony of factory workers, the empty time of leisure, the existential meaninglessness of Sartre’s Roquentin, and the profound attunement of Heidegger. And, of course, there is the simple and democratic boredom of the rest of us—that ubiquitous affective state that permeates and colors our everyday existence. The aim of this entry is to provide the reader with a philosophical map of the progression of the concept and experience of boredom throughout the Western tradition—from antiquity to current work in Anglo-American philosophy. By focusing primarily on key philosophical works on boredom, but also often discussing important literary and scientific texts, the entry exposes the reader to the rich history of boredom and illustrates how the different manifestations of boredom—idleness, horror loci, acedia, sloth, mal du siècle, melancholy, ennui, monotony, and emptiness—are grounded in the historical context in which they arise.