In Search of a Theory of Minor Powers in Interstate Asymmetric Conflict

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-40
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Conflict ◽  
Minor Powers

Why Minor Powers Risk Wars with Major Powers

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marinko Bobić
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Window Of Opportunity ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Asymmetric Conflict ◽  
Mixed Methods Approach ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Regime Stability ◽  
Minor Powers

Major powers have immense resources at their disposal, while minor powers are assumed to avoid wars and power politics due to structural and material constraints. This provokes the question why do some minor powers nonetheless decide to militarily engage their vastly stronger opponents, particularly major powers? Inspired by several theoretical insights, this book proposes a more complex framework of minor powers in interstate asymmetric conflict. It analyses five conditions highlighted by previous studies: domestic crisis, foreign support, window of opportunity, anomalous beliefs, and regime stability. The theoretical framework works well with a mixed-methods approach, a medium-N research design (Qualitative Comparative Analysis), and three case studies: Iraq (1990), Moldova (1992), and Serbia (1999). The book finds that by looking through the lenses of multiple theories, one can observe a more nuanced relationship how different conditions interact in impacting minor powers’ decisions. Ultimately, minor powers militarily engage major powers when facing a more important domestic crisis and when they also believe that they have a window of opportunity or support from another major power in order to constrain major powers’ capability and resolve. Looking at the current conflict in Syria, there are important policy implications given the observation that minor powers do and will continue to challenge major powers in the future.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Marinko Bobić
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Similar Question ◽  
Asymmetric Conflict ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Minor Powers

Looking at examples of interstate asymmetric conflict, this chapter argues that regimes of minor powers fighting major powers might seem suicidal. This book was not the first piece of research to have been puzzled by such behaviour. However, in this introduction, the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies are highlighted. The aim of this book is to attempt to address some of these weaknesses by asking a similar question on more recent cases, namely, why or under what conditions have minor powers attempted to resist or challenge others they know to be significantly more powerful than they by force of arms in the post-Cold War period? That said, this chapter argues that problem-driven pragmatism allows us to take insights from multiple theories. Finally, this chapter discusses the data, findings, relevance, scope and the main audience that might be interested in reading this book. At the end of the chapter, the organisation of the book is provided.

In Search of a Theory of Minor Powers in Interstate Asymmetric Conflict

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-40
Author(s):  
Marinko Bobić
Keyword(s):  
Military Personnel ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Window Of Opportunity ◽  
Asymmetric Conflict ◽  
Regime Stability ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Minor Powers

The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of minor powers in asymmetric interstate conflicts, in line with problem-driven pragmatism. The framework examines how foreign support, window of opportunity, domestic crisis, regime stability, and anomalous beliefs shape their choices, particularly the choice to go to war. There are theoretical disagreements over definite roles each condition plays, the reason why further inquiry is justified. Moreover, to account for the possibility that conditions can offset or complement each other, the concept of conjunctural causation is utilised, reflecting on greater complexity in understanding the asymmetric conflict. An important caveat is raised, namely, that this study focuses on conventional interstate wars, because, unlike unconventional conflict, state actors have identifiable territory, resources, and military personnel. Such exposure makes them more vulnerable in asymmetric conflict compared to the vulnerability of non-state actors.

scholarly journals Concession Bargaining

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (9) ◽  
pp. 2017-2039 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federica Alberti ◽  
Sven Fischer ◽  
Werner Güth ◽  
Kei Tsutsui
Keyword(s):  
Finite Number ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Dynamic Interaction ◽  
Asymmetric Conflict ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Bargaining Experiments

We test experimentally whether dynamic interaction is crucial for concession bargaining. In our complete information bargaining experiments, two parties with asymmetric conflict payoffs try to agree how to share a commonly known pie by bargaining over a finite number of successive trials (agreement attempts). We compare the fully dynamic interaction to one less dynamic and one static protocol. In the quasi-dynamic protocol, later trials merely reveal that so far no agreement has been reached, and in the static protocol, no feedback information is given about earlier trials. We find that neither conflict rate nor efficiency or inequality of agreements differs across protocols. Comparing different numbers of maximal trials shows that more trials render conflict more likely due to less concessions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document