Serbia: Military Confrontation with NATO

Chapter six covers the military confrontation launched by the NATO alliance against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) in 1999. It explains why and under what conditions Slobodan Milošević’s regime rejected a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo conflict. It does so by highlighting how antagonisms in Kosovo presented a unique domestic crisis, giving Milošević an opportunity to seize power and ride on the popular sentiment, but also limited Milošević’s ability to compromise with Kosovo Albanians. To retain regime stability and popularity, Milošević resisted compromising on Kosovo. In addition, he was given foreign support by Russia, which opposed NATO intervention at a diplomatic level. Once the conditions change, a counter-factual analysis shows that so does their causal power, further strengthening the findings.

Iraq: Military Confrontation with the United States and its Thirty-Three Allies

This chapter traces the military confrontation between Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the United States backed by the international community, known as the Gulf War. To understand Saddam's decision to militarily engage the US, one must go back to his rise in power, his beliefs, and consequences of the Iraq-Iran war, as well as the invasion of Kuwait. The simplified explanation is that Saddam found himself in a difficult domestic situation. He had to maintain an extensive system of control, partially dependent on coercion, and partially dependent on incentives and rewards. This system was shaken by the Iraq-Iran war. While such domestic crisis alone might not have induced Saddam to fight a losing war, his anomalous beliefs ensured that he thought he could win by seeing the US as unable to stomach another war. In a way, such a belief could be interpreted as a wrongly-perceived window of opportunity. The counter-factual assessment provides additional evidence that a change in these conditions would likely have led to a different outcome.

Conclusion: Dealing with Complexity, Defeat and Beliefs

The concluding chapter develops four main findings of the book, based on the evidence obtained in all the empirical chapters. First, there is more than one way for a conflict to brew. All five conditions that were studied have causal relevance but in different ways. Second, major powers are not the main threat in these asymmetric disputes, but rather it is the domestic crisis because it can threaten regime stability, and thus the very survival of the regime. Third, minor powers seem to have reachable war objectives, such as regime survival or denying domestic opponents a victory. Fourth, the case of Iraq shows a failure of the regime to comprehend an opponent’s intentions and capabilities. Such anomalous beliefs are particularly a consequence of closed, personalistic regimes where there are no competitive ideas that can dislodge subjective views. The concluding chapter wraps up with some insights on how these findings can be used to assess the current Syrian conflict and policy implications.

Pathways to Conflict Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

Chapter three provides a medium-N, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) analysis of the empirical record, assessing the outcomes of all 20 militarised interstate disputes that have taken place in the post-Cold War era. QCA is the most proper method given that the focus of this study is on several conditions and their complex relationship. QCA results show that 9 of the 20 cases of asymmetric militarised disputes resulted in war, confirming the importance of this phenomena. Moreover, the analysis reveals that not a single condition is both necessary and sufficient to explain the minor power's choice to go to war. However, the domestic crisis seems to be of particular importance, as it is a necessary condition for the outcome to occur. While this is somewhat expected, more surprising results indicate that domestic crisis is only sufficient when occurring together with a stable regime and either foreign support or window of opportunity. Likewise, regimes with anomalous beliefs tend to ignore the importance of conditions such as foreign support or window of opportunity. Given the limited number of cases, these results can be further strengthened through case studies, that is, process tracing and counterfactual assessment.

Moldova: Military Confrontation with Russian Forces

Chapter five focuses on the asymmetric conflict between Moldova and the Russian forces which supported separatists in Transnistria. The purpose was to uncover why Mircea Snegur’s Moldovan regime seemed unyielding to Russian demands, which resulted in armed conflict. The underlying argument is primarily based on the necessary condition, namely that Chisinau had a domestic crisis that needed immediate attention. Moldova was trying to claim its sovereignty, where an important step entailed establishing a common identity and territorial control. While Snegur’s presidency was stable and popular, it was dependent on nationalists’ support. Such dependency required policies that marginalised minorities and fuelled conflict with Russia, which wanted to retain Moldova within its sphere of influence. However, having perceived numerous crises unfolding in the late Soviet Union and emerging Russia, Snegur made a calculatable gamble that Russia would not be able to commit to a conflict. In other words, Snegur perceived a window of opportunity. The gamble failed, however. Nonetheless, with a counter-factual assessment, these findings are further strengthened.

Introduction

Looking at examples of interstate asymmetric conflict, this chapter argues that regimes of minor powers fighting major powers might seem suicidal. This book was not the first piece of research to have been puzzled by such behaviour. However, in this introduction, the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies are highlighted. The aim of this book is to attempt to address some of these weaknesses by asking a similar question on more recent cases, namely, why or under what conditions have minor powers attempted to resist or challenge others they know to be significantly more powerful than they by force of arms in the post-Cold War period? That said, this chapter argues that problem-driven pragmatism allows us to take insights from multiple theories. Finally, this chapter discusses the data, findings, relevance, scope and the main audience that might be interested in reading this book. At the end of the chapter, the organisation of the book is provided.

In Search of a Theory of Minor Powers in Interstate Asymmetric Conflict

The second chapter presents the theoretical framework of minor powers in asymmetric interstate conflicts, in line with problem-driven pragmatism. The framework examines how foreign support, window of opportunity, domestic crisis, regime stability, and anomalous beliefs shape their choices, particularly the choice to go to war. There are theoretical disagreements over definite roles each condition plays, the reason why further inquiry is justified. Moreover, to account for the possibility that conditions can offset or complement each other, the concept of conjunctural causation is utilised, reflecting on greater complexity in understanding the asymmetric conflict. An important caveat is raised, namely, that this study focuses on conventional interstate wars, because, unlike unconventional conflict, state actors have identifiable territory, resources, and military personnel. Such exposure makes them more vulnerable in asymmetric conflict compared to the vulnerability of non-state actors.