Joint Competence of the European Community and its Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization

Author(s):  
Christiane Gerstetter

This chapter analyses how the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement bodies legitimize their decisions and by implication also the WTO Dispute Settlement System as well as the WTO as an institution more broadly. The author argues there are two relevant dimensions for understanding how judges legitimize judicial decisions: the substantive outcomes of cases, that is who wins and loses and what interpretations are adopted, and the way a judicial decision is justified. She concludes that the WTO dispute settlement bodies act strategically in order to win the acceptance of the member states, and ultimately legitimize this dispute settlement system as a judicial entity.


2001 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron ◽  
Kevin R. Gray

Unlike the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT), the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)1 covers a much wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now embraces services, intellectual property, procurement, investment and agriculture. Moreover, the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements, Panel reports and understandings of the parties. All trade obligations are subsumed under the umbrella of the WTO, of which all parties are members. Member States have to accept the obligations contained in all the WTO covered agreements: they cannot pick and choose.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 61-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

One of the principal achievements of the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization was the new mechanism for dispute settlement, embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. While its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (and the 1979 Agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) had already evolved, to a considerable degree, from a negotiating forum for the conduct of world trade diplomacy to a “judicial” system properly so called, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding nevertheless marked a decisive step forward.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 61-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

One of the principal achievements of the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization was the new mechanism for dispute settlement, embodied in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. While its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (and the 1979 Agreements resulting from the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) had already evolved, to a considerable degree, from a negotiating forum for the conduct of world trade diplomacy to a “judicial” system properly so called, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding nevertheless marked a decisive step forward.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1039
Author(s):  
Yuka Fukunaga

International institutions are often criticized for their democratic deficit. Among these institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system is most frequently targeted. This article focuses on the strength of this critique and aims to refute its factual premise through the examination of several Panel and Appellate Body decisions. The author also argues that the WTO dispute settlement system deliberately leaves a certain degree of discontinuity between members’ domestic legal orders and the WTO Agreement, such that the system pays a degree of deference to member states and allows substantial discretion in the process of internalizing the rules of the WTO Agreement within domestic legal orders. Finally, the author concludes that this discontinuity remains strong, and serves to enhance the democratic autonomy of member states instead of defeating it.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Muhammad ISLAM

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) relies on scientific evidence as a conclusive risk assessment criterion, which ignores the inherent limitations of science. This article highlights certain trade-restrictive effects of scientific evidence and comments on the Agreement’s aversions to precautionary measures and the consumer concern of the harmful effects of biotech products that may be necessary to protect public health and biosecurity in many WTO Member States. These measures and concerns have become pressing issues due to surging consumer awareness and vigilance concerning environmental protection and food safety. The Agreement is yet to overcome the weaknesses of its endorsed international standardising bodies, the problematic definition of scientific evidence and treatment of justification for scientific risk assessment methods and the implementation difficulties faced by most developing states. This article analyses these issues under the provisions of the Agreement and the interpretations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in disputes involving SPS matters, which fall short of addressing scientific uncertainty surrounding biotech products and their associated risks.


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