Prosedur dan Efektifitas Mekanisme Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan dan Investasi Dalam ASEAN

Trade and investment play an important role in the practice of relations between countries in the prospective economic cooperation efforts to increase the economic growth of each country. In this regard, ASEAN also has legal instruments that regulate transactions and investments among other countries. In the trade regime, ASEAN has several agreements such as the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement, ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement, ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, and so on. Meanwhile in the investment regime, ASEAN has the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. One of the important components in a Regional Trade Agreement is the clause of a legally binding dispute settlement mechanism. In the trade regime, the system and mechanism of the dispute resolution procedures are separated from other trade agreements, the ASEAN Protocol on the Enhanced Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Meanwhile in the Investment regime, the system and mechanism of the dispute resolution procedure are regulated in the same agreement in the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. This article will describe the procedural mechanism for the dispute resolution framework of the trade and investment regime in ASEAN, as well as focus on each dispute resolution system with the preferences of each participating country, with differences in the use of the dispute system in the WTO.

Import Demand Function in India Under the Liberalised Trade Regime

The trade liberalisation policy was initiated in India in the 1980s but executed effectively since the early 1990s. Since then India’s foreign trade embarks on a new road with a rapid expansion of export and import. Over the period, import exceed export. Identifying factors influencing such a significant elevation of import is a relevant issue of research. This study appraises import demand function in India for the liberalised trade regime particularly, for an extended period 1980–2018, and for the post-reform period, 1992–2018. The study identifies domestic income in aggregated and disaggregated level with exchange rate, trade openness and population growth as significant determinants of import demand. The income has a positive impact on import demand, where income elasticity of import demand differs significantly across the aggregate income and its components—consumption, investment and export expenditure. The exchange rate has a negative impact, implies a depreciation of Indian currency decrease import demand. The trade openness causes a rise in import demand both in the long run and in the short run. Population growth also raises import demand. The econometric diagnostics corroborate the fact that the estimated import demand functions are stable and robust. JEL Codes: F10, F14, C22

World Trade Organization: Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang Impor Ayam (Brazil V. Indonesia)

The world trade regime began in 1948 which began with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After experiencing several developments, a forum was formed namely the World Trade Organization (WTO). By ratifying the agreement on the WTO, Indonesia must adjust the existing regulations to the provisions or decisions made by the trade organization. In 2009, Indonesia was having a dispute about chicken importation with Brazil. This case arises when Indonesia implements policies that inhibit chicken export activities from Brazil to Indonesia. Indonesia claims that Indonesia only ensures that the chicken is healthy and halal for consumption. This dispute was then brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body with case number DS 484: Indonesia - Measures Meat Chicken Meat and Chicken Products. Keyword: Dispute Settlement Body, World Trade Organization, Impor Ayam, Brazil, Indonesia. Abstrak. Rezim perdagangan dunia sudah dimulai sejak tahun 1948 yang diawali dengan adanya General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Setelah mengalami beberapa perkembangan, dibentuklah sebuah wadah yaitu World Trade Organization (WTO) yang merupakan organisasi perdagangan dunia. Dengan meratifikasi agreement tentang WTO, Indoensia harus menyesuaikan peraturan dan regulasi yang ada dengan ketentuan atau hasil keputusan organisasi perdagangan tersebut. Pada 2009, Indonesia terkena sengketa impor ayam dengan Brazil. Kasus ini timbul ketika Indonesia diduga memberlakukan kebijakan yang menghambat kegiatan ekspor ayam dari Brazil ke Indonesia. Sengketa ini kemudian dibawa ke Badan Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO dengan nomor kasus DS 484: Indonesia - Measures Meat Chiken Meat and Chiken Products. Kata Kunci: Dispute Settlement Body, World Trade Organization, Impor Ayam, Brazil, Indonesia.

Trading Away Tariffs: The Operations of the GATT System

Since its formation, the GATT/WTO system has facilitated a worldwide reduction of trade barriers. We return to a founding moment of the regime, the GATT 1947 (GATT47), and look closely at the liberalization process, analyzing exactly what concessions were granted to whom and in return for what. With these data, we evaluate three prominent explanations for the operation of the early GATT. First, we ask whether or not US negotiators granted asymmetric access to the US market to spur post-war recovery. Second, we look at how the rules adopted in GATT47 balanced the interests of import sensitive producers with those of the more nascent exporter interests. Third, we examine specific US concessions and ask whether or not the US used the domestic market to either increase the productive capacity of nations damaged during the war and/or to bolster unstable regimes. Our most general finding is that the US, at least in this first Round of the trade regime, was less a liberal warrior and more a seeker of stability, and that tariff setting was significantly constrained by the institutions governing global tariff negotiations.

On Trade Justice, Power and Institutions – Some Questions for Risse and Wollner

While Risse and Wollner make an important contribution to theorising global justice and trade, I identify certain concerns with their approach and suggest an alternative that addresses these. First, I query their emphasis on subjection to the trade regime as a morally salient feature, suggesting their argument trades on an ambiguity, and fails to connect the trade regime, as a trigger, with their preferred account of trade-justice-as-non-exploitation. Second, I examine their treatment of the WTO, how they understand international organisations as inheritors of states’ obligations, and how far an organisation like the WTO can or should be self-consciously reoriented towards justice-as-non-exploitation. Third, I ask how their account is distinct from existing approaches, and whether it makes sense to apply the same conception of justice across diverse agents and institutions. I conclude by sketching an alternative approach, which makes the justification of states’ policies to outsiders the central problem of trade justice.

America and the Trade Regime: What Went Wrong?

The era of American leadership in the multilateral trading regime has ended. This paper argues that this current antipathy to trade is unsurprising: support for US leadership of the regime has always rested on a precarious balance among domestic interests. To overcome a historic bias in favor of home market production, American leaders created incentives for exporters to organize while creating roadblocks for import-competing firms and their employees. The dominance of the exporters’ voice had a significant influence on the policies the US pursued in the design and execution of the global trade regime. Most importantly, the absence of labor's voice undermined the prospect for “embedded liberalism” and instead resulted in an anemic system of adjustment for job loss at home and limited support for worker interests within the regime. While policymakers’ decision to shift power away from potential “veto” groups may have been necessary for US leadership of the Liberal International Order, this institutional design undermined a robust response to the economic dislocation thought to be a result of globalization. The result was a fracturing of the coalition in support of American leadership in the GATT/WTO regime.