Is the WTO Appellate Body in Limbo? The Roots of the Crisis in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the Available Routes Navigating the Quagmire

In its over 25 years' history, the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been touted as one of the most active and successful international adjudicatory systems in relation to other international dispute settlement fora. The process in the engagement of the system presents a tripartite structure consisting of consultation, panel and appellate stages, and the enforcement proceedings. The functions of these processes help to promote the trust and confidence of the member states in the WTO trade dispute settlement system. Now the Appellate Body (AB) is paralysed following the incapacitation and consequential suspension of the appellate function of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), because of the insufficient membership caused by the United States blockade on the appointment process of AB members. The paper discusses the trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement reform from the GATT regime, the root cause of the suspension of the Appellate Body, and the options available for the disputants in and outside the WTO system. It concludes that the system possesses policy defects if the attitude of a single state can render the AB non-functional and should be transformed when the appellate system is resuscitated.

The Revitalisation of the Object and Purpose of the TRIPS Agreement

The limited role the objectives and principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) (Arts 7 and 8) have played so far in the interpretation and implementation of its substantive provisions has often been criticised. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the ‘Australia—Plain Packaging’ dispute are likely to change this situation for the future as, for the first time, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement bodies fully engaged with Arts 7 and 8 to interpret Art 20 relative to the use of trade marks. Reliance on these provisions led the Panel and the Appellate Body to conclude that there are legitimate reasons for which Members may encumber trade mark use. The awakening of these two long dormant provisions could have a fundamental impact in offering the possibility of a more flexible reading of TRIPS. It could indeed secure the adaptability of intellectual property rights to the evolution of economic, technological and social circumstances by guaranteeing a more balanced interpretation of the limitations and exceptions included in the Agreement, for example, as advocated several years ago by a group of international IP scholars in the ‘Declaration on a balanced interpretation of the three-step test’. Furthermore, the use of these two provisions could serve as a gateway for the taking into account of ethical imperatives, supported by international human rights in the interpretation of the TRIPS norms, such as, for example, public health imperatives, crucial in the context of pandemics. Such a reading has been advocated in the past and the ‘Plain Packaging’ reports might lead to a more frequent and welcome reliance on human rights arguments in the context of international trade law.

TRIPS Pluralism

The article explains that the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement by WTO dispute-settlement panels and the Appellate Body has palpably shifted since the establishment of the WTO in 1995. Some of this shift is also arguably present in disputes concerning other WTO instruments. This progressive shift comes at a time when key debates about TRIPS waivers are taking place on the rue de Lausanne, namely a first for the COVID-19 pandemic and a second possible one for environmental protection measures related to climate change. According to the proposed pluralist analysis of TRIPS, it was less likely as of 2020 that the WTO dispute-settlement system would find unjustifiable inconsistencies between WTO commitments, on the one hand, and measures to protect public health or mitigate climate change, on the other hand. Whether future Appellate Body will follow that jurisprudence is an open question. Though the analysis contained in the article may make the COVID-related TRIPS waivers doctrinally unnecessary and allow Members to take measures now, its main aim is to inform the debates about the waivers and the future interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, including the three-step test.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WTO TOBACCO PLAIN PACKAGING DISPUTES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES

Australia became the first country to introduce standardised or plain packaging laws for tobacco products in 2011. However, they immediately came under direct and indirect challenge from the tobacco industry in various domestic and international fora, including at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO-consistency of Australia's measures was not settled until June 2020, when the Appellate Body upheld two WTO panels’ earlier findings that Australia had acted consistently with its obligations under certain WTO agreements. This article critically analyses the Appellate Body's key findings and their implications for implementing other public health measures. It is shown that these implications are multifaceted, have political, practical and legal dimensions and are likely to reach beyond the WTO dispute resolution system's bounds into other international trade and investment law contexts.

The Collapse of the Appellate Body as a Determining Factor of the WTO’s Future

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the leading institutions involved in global economic regulation. Its purposes are to ensure multilateral cooperation on the liberalization of international trade, harmonize existing standards and requirements, and peacefully resolve trade disputes between countries. Since 11 December 2019, dispute resolution has been handicapped due to the consistent blocking of the appointment of members to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) by the United States. This has reduced the multilateral trading system’s (MTS) predictability and threatens its final decay. In this article, the fundamental and formal causes of the collapse are described, and its circumvention mechanisms and effectiveness are discussed. At the same time, an assessment is given of the possibility to overcome the collapse in 2021, considering the change of the U.S. president and other events. Special attention is paid to Russia’s position and its current and potential losses. Finally, the issue of dispute resolution through regional trade agreements is proposed for discussion. The fundamental reasons for the collapse were the shifting balance of power in the world order and the WTO’s inflexibility in adjusting the rulebook and its procedures. The main reasons for the U.S.’ dissatisfaction are objective but based on formalities; the blockage of the AB is an overreaction. Moreover, the U.S.’ position on this issue has not changed with the new president. As a result, there is abuse of the current situation as WTO members file appeals “into the void.” Existing tools to circumvent the collapse are partial and not yet popular among WTO members. Russia needs to resume the AB’s work to complete previously started high-profile disputes and to defend its interests in the future.

WHAT ARE THE THREATS TO THE FUTURE OF THE WTO?

Today we are witnessing a serious crisis that could lead to the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This crisis is the consequence of the uncooperative behavior of the triad: the United States, the European Union and East Asia. When there is a confrontation between these three most powerful regional blocs, there is inevitably a blockage and a destructive trade war similar to that of the 1930s. In these times of crisis, each country tries to save its economy by relying on the strategy of protectionism. The negotiation and regulatory functions of the WTO are paralyzed: the Dispute Settlement Body is seriously affected by the refusal of the United States, since 2016, to renew the members of the Appellate Body (AB) whose mandates were expiring. This jeopardizes international rules negotiated since 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. The existence of liberalization fatigue and a growing rejection of globalization raises questions about the future of the WTO.

Reforms for culmination of the deadlock in appellate body of WTO: An agenda of saving the multilateral trading system

The World Trade Organization's (WTO’s) dispute settlement mechanism, known as the "pearl in the crown," is stalled due to United States (U.S.) obstruction, which prevents appellate body members from being ordained. This situation continues, and the WTO’s dispute settlement function is paralyzed since 2019. The WTO has faced a crisis in recent years, and the trade legislation has stagnated. The dispute settlement body was also blocked due to U.S. interference, which led to the failure of the appellate body’s members to be selected. The data has been gathered for this descriptive study using secondary research method, including different newspaper articles and the internet, which were outlined and noted. This paper presents and evaluates several existing proposals on how to get out of the impasse. This paper points out whether the existing WTO members can choose to join or not participate in establishing a new appellate body. On this basis, it makes its own relatively unique proposal, namely, to establish a substantial dispute settlement mechanism outside the WTO, parallel to the existing dispute settlement mechanism, and it demonstrates the legal feasibility of the proposal. Immediately, the states should begin negotiations on the significant agreements required for this new appellate body. It will effectively solve the deadlock in the dispute settlement mechanism caused by the United States, blocking the appointment of members of the appellate body.

‘Two Roads Diverged in [Soft]wood’ Targeted Dumping, Differential Pricing Methodology, and Zeroing: US – Canada Anti-Dumping in Softwood Lumber

The United States and Canada have a long-standing series of disputes over softwood lumber that until now have focused on alleged subsidies and countervailing duties (CVDs). The United States changed things up this time around and the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) found dumping after applying the Differential Pricing Methodology to softwood lumber from Canada. The panel found that the USDOC erroneously aggregated export price differences when applying the differential pricing methodology (DPM), but departed from the WTO Appellate Body's previous ruling in US–Washing Machines regarding the use of zeroing and the inclusion of differential prices under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. To date, the United States and Canada have not been able to resolve the long-standing softwood lumber dispute, and this time the focus shifts from subsidies and countervailing duties to anti-dumping duties. It remains to be seen what happens in this specific dispute on appeal – if, and when, the WTO Appellate Body starts to function again. It will also be interesting to see whether this panel decision encourages parties to argue for, and future panels to permit departures from, Appellate Body rulings with which they disagree.

Necessity Testing

Part III comprises two chapters, Chapter Five and Chapter Six. These chapters together investigate the decisions of WTO panels and the Appellate Body in environmental and health cases. The chapters examine the major contribution made through WTO dispute settlement to the emerging global regulatory standard of regulatory coherence. Specifically, Chapter Five analyses the elaboration of the ‘necessity’ formula in the GATT and the GATS general exceptions’ subparagraphs, as well as under the TBT and SPS Agreements. The WTO adjudicatory process appears to have been protecting the traditional procedural justification of international law’s relative authority claim by enabling respect for domestic decision-making through democratic processes. Members’ entitlement to choose their level of protection against a risk is still at present fully recognised and there is vital scope for recognition of the importance to WTO Members of long-term non-economic interests requiring a multifaceted policy response.