Burden of Proof and Fairness in the Criminal Trial: Revisiting Woolmington v DPP (1935)

2015 ◽  
Vol 290 ◽  
pp. 75-80
Author(s):  
Kazimierz J. Pawelec

The last big revision of the code of criminal procedure introduced many changes to chapter V of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with evidence. These changes also did not circumvent Chapter 22 containing regulations regarding experts, professionals and translators. They are not particularly important, but in conjunction with any changes in the general part of criminal procedure including the rules on burden of proof, probative process, amended rules regarding the benefit of the doubt, probative preclusion and others, acquire special importance. This was also the basic issues of this publication, especially since a criminal trial is not devoted exclusively to sentencing, but rather, above all, reaching the material truth. Now, increasingly, it is necessary to use procedural authorities with the help of experts and specialists. Likewise, the parties cannot remain indifferent to the huge improvement, in all fields of knowledge, and therefore the use of expert assistance becomes a necessity for them.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Duff

On 1 April 1996, a rather odd provision was introduced into the Scottish criminal justice process, namely a duty on both prosecution and defence to try to agree uncontroversial evidence in advance of criminal trial.1 As far as the writer is aware, such a provision is unique, although the philosophy underlying its introduction is not totally alien to inquisitorial systems of criminal justice.2 What is particularly peculiar about this duty is that there is no sanction for a failure, however unreasonable, to agree uncontroversial evidence.3 The lack of a sanction resulted from a concern that the creation of any penalty would impinge unjustifiably upon the rights of the accused. The intention in this article is to explore in detail the relationship between the duty to agree uncontroversial evidence and the position of the accused, and to suggest that the imposition of a sanction for a breach of this duty is not as problematic as was thought by those responsible for the legislation.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

The CSI Effect posits that exposure to television programs that portray forensic science (e.g., CSI: Crime Scene Investigation) can change the way jurors evaluate forensic evidence. The most commonly researched hypothesis under the CSI Effect suggests that shows like CSI depict an unrealistically high standard of forensic science and thus unreasonably inflate the expectations of jurors. Jurors are thus more likely to vote to acquit, and prosecutors face higher burden of proof. We review (1) the theory behind the CSI Effect, (2) the perception of the effect among legal actors, (3) the academic treatment of the effect, and (4) how courts have dealt with the effect. We demonstrate that while legal actors do see the CSI Effect as a serious issue, there is virtually no empirical evidence suggesting it is a real phenomenon. Moreover, many of the remedies employed by courts may do no more than introduce bias into juror decision making or even trigger the CSI Effect when it would not normally occur (i.e., the self-fulfilling prophesy). We end with suggestions for the proper treatment of the CSI Effect in courts, and directions for future scholarly work.


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