Digital Humanities and the History of Philosophy: The Case of Nietzsche's Moral Psychology

2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 241
Author(s):  
Bamford
Author(s):  
Bernd Kulawik

Bernd Kulawik is a trained marine engineer who studied physics, musicology and philosophy at the Technical Universities of Dresden and Berlin. MA thesis in 1996 about Monteverdi’s «Seconda Pratica». PhD in 2002 with a dissertation about drawings in the Berlin «Codex Destailleur D» for Antonio da Sangallo the Younger’s last project for St. Peter’s in Rome. Since 1988 he worked in research libraries and institutes in Berlin, Rome, Berne, Einsiedeln and Zurich, mostly as developer for database projects. Since 2013 he could take up his research about the study of ancient architecture in Renaissance Rome which led to the rediscovery of the forgotten «Accademia de lo Studio de l’Architettura». This academy almost completely realised Claudio Tolomei’s ambitious program from 1542 formerly believed to be unrealisable. Other research interests are the history of philosophy, Renaissance music and the epistemic and technical preconditions as well as long-time perspectives of the Digital Humanities.


Chelovek RU ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (14) ◽  
pp. 88-96
Author(s):  
Alexander Sanzhenakov ◽  

Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document