Marx the Fichtean

We ignore the history of philosophy at our peril. Engels, who typically conflates Marx and Marxism, points to the relation of Marxism to the tradition while also denying it. In his little book on Feuerbach, Engels depicts Feuerbach as leading Marx away from Hegel, away from classical German philosophy, away from philosophy and towards materialism and science. This view suggests that Marx is at best negatively related to Classical German philosophy, including Hegel. Yet Engels elsewhere suggests that Marx belongs to the classical German philosophical tradition. In the preface to Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels wrote: “We German socialists are proud that we trace our descent not only from Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel” (Marx & Engels, Collected Works). In this paper I will focus on Marx’s relation to Fichte. This relation is rarely mentioned in the Marxist debate, but I will argue, it is crucial for the formulation of Marx’s position, and hence for assessing his contribution accurately. One of the results of this study will be to indicate that Marx, in reacting against Hegel, did not, as is often suggested, ‘leave’ philosophy, but in fact made a crucial philosophical contribution.

Critical thinking; the father of all disciplines

Looking at the history of philosophy, one will see that philosophy is often credited with the attributes of critical thinking, hence, critical thinking is always discussed as a tool of or the same as philosophy. Whereas it seems almost impossible to find philosophy or philosophizing without critical thinking, it may not be true to say that they are the same. This work therefore, demonstrates that philosophy and critical thinking are very complementary, but are not same, and critical thinking is not a tool of philosophy. It agrees that philosophy is the mother, but show that critical thinking is the father, of rational enquiries. For long, critical thinking and philosophy have served to produce results of rational enquiry hence the identification of the critical thinking DNA as is found in all the results of rational and creative thought. Adopting the method of critical analysis, this work concludes that critical thinking should be seen and appreciated for what it is and that it is better for all disciplines to emphasize the need and role of their paternal (critical thinking) DNA as it is what brings them to their pragmatic utilitarian value.

WHY STUDYING THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY MATTERS

The debate over whether and how philosophers of today may usefully engage with philosophers of the past is nearly as old as the history of philosophy itself. Does the study of the history of philosophy train or corrupt the budding philosopher's mind? Why study the history of philosophy? And, how to study the history of philosophy? I discuss some mainstream approaches to the study of the history of philosophy (with special focus on ancient philosophy), before explicating the one I adopt and commend.

Introduction

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the study of the history of philosophy. In general, there is an enormous difference between those who concern themselves with ancient philosophy, those who concern themselves with medieval philosophy, and the students of the history of modern philosophy. And, across this distinction, there is a great variety of approaches. One should not forget that the historiography of philosophy itself in many ways is a product of history and reflects the historical context in which it is pursued. Nevertheless, what this book is interested in is not the factual question of why historians of philosophy do what they do, but the theoretical question, the question of how one ought to conceive of and explain what they do; though they themselves in this work may not in fact be guided by these assumptions and principles, there must be such principles to the extent that their activity is a rational activity. It is also important to note that philosophers tend to criticize historians of philosophy as being unduly historical and not sufficiently philosophical.

The Uses of a Historical History of Philosophy

This chapter identifies the uses of a historical history of philosophy. There is an inherent interest in this sort of study, but there also may be an external interest in it, which is perfectly legitimate as long as it does not interfere with the study itself. That is to say that, though it would be inappropriate to let one’s philosophical interests interfere with one’s historical study of the history of philosophy, it nevertheless is perfectly appropriate to see whether the results of this study can serve one’s philosophical interests. The chapter begins by considering briefly the inherent interest of this sort of study. One thing which this sort of study does for us is that it gives us a reliable picture of what philosophy actually, empirically, has been from its beginnings to the present day. Whatever philosophical views one may have as to what philosophy is, or should be, here we see what it actually is, or at least what it presents itself as from the enlightened perspective of the historian. As to the possible external interests, there are a great number of them, some of which the chapter lists before focusing on the interest of most concern to philosophers; namely, the possible philosophical usefulness of a historical study of the history of philosophy.

The Historical History of Philosophy and Its Object

This chapter evaluates the historical history of philosophy. Given the very strong philosophical assumptions underlying the early philosophical histories of philosophy, and given in particular the fact that they tended to be written from the point of view of some kind of idealism, it is not surprising that they should have met with some resistance, in particular outside philosophy. Thus, one finds Albert Schwegler criticizing Hegel’s method of treating the history of philosophy, rejecting any kind of philosophical history of philosophy as history. He insists that the systematical study of the history of philosophy is the task of a historian and has to be pursued in precisely the way one studies any other kind of history or history in general. Zeller therefore advocates a purely historical approach to the history of philosophy, a historian’s history of philosophy, and his own monumental work on the history of Greek philosophy is inspired by this conception, just as it, in turn, inspires a lot of work, at least on ancient philosophy of the same kind. The chapter then presents a systematical consideration of the historical history of philosophy.

The Internal History

This chapter addresses the internal history of philosophy. This is the history of philosophy explained in terms of the philosophical enterprise itself, as it is conceived and pursued at each time; that is, the history of philosophy explained in terms of the actual philosophical considerations that made philosophy evolve the way it did, to the extent that the history can be explained this way. It can be called ‘internal’ because it tries, as far as possible, to explain the course of development in terms of considerations internal to philosophy, as opposed to factors outside philosophy; for instance, social pressures of some kind or another. In contrast to the internal history of philosophy, one may call a history of philosophy ‘external’ if it describes and explains the history of philosophy insofar as it is shaped by social factors outside philosophy. This distinction is not supposed to be exhaustive of all work on the history of philosophy, though it could easily be redefined to be exhaustive by just subsuming everything that does not belong to the internal history (e.g. psychological or biological studies) under the heading of ‘external history’.

The Study of Ancient Philosophy

This chapter reflects on the study of ancient philosophy. Ancient philosophy can be studied in many ways. The thoughts of ancient philosophers are of great interest not just as philosophical thoughts; many of them, in one way or another, are also of great historical importance. They help to explain a great many historical facts, not just in the history of philosophy but in many other histories. Or they are reflections of some historical development we may be interested in; again, this may be a development in the history of philosophy or in some other history, even one that at first may seem to have very little to do with philosophy. Thus, there are many approaches to the thought of ancient philosophers, all of which contribute to a better understanding of it. One can pursue each of the many histories in which ancient philosophy, either as a whole or in part, plays a role and try to determine what this role is in a manner appropriate for the history in question. Indeed, one reason why the study of ancient philosophy is so attractive and so lively is that it allows for so many interests and approaches.

The Historian

This chapter focuses on the historian of philosophy. There is a certain amount of historical evidence in the case of philosophy, mainly in the form of texts, or rather copies thereof, but also of inscriptions or even of archaeological remains. The historian has to collect this evidence, evaluate it, and reconstruct, on its basis, a history which is sufficiently supported by it to make it difficult, if not impossible, to think of an equally plausible, or even more plausible, account that fits the evidence as well. The difficulty is not only that it has become a matter of considerable controversy whether there actually is one characteristic way in which historians ought to go about their business and which way this may be. It also should give one pause for thought that, in fact, general historians do not write history of philosophy. This suggests that the historiography of philosophy is not just a matter of applying the historical method to a particular history. Clearly, the most important point here is that it takes some special competence to write the history of a discipline. Having the competence of a contemporary philosopher allows one to tell which arguments are acceptable and which are not.

The Account and the Explanation of the Historical Development

This chapter explores the account and the explanation of the historical development of philosophy. It was only at the end of the eighteenth century that this development itself became the focus of attention, and thus the phrase ‘history of philosophy’ came to take on the now familiar meaning of an account of the historical development of philosophy from its beginning to the present day. What characterizes the historian’s approach to the historical development of philosophy is that they refuse to resort to such philosophical assumptions about philosophy, about history, and about the history of philosophy to understand and to explain this historical development. The historian tries to understand and to explain it, as well as it can be explained, purely in terms of historical facts, facts which can be ascertained on the basis of the available historical evidence. Meanwhile, if one is concerned with the factual development of philosophy, one should focus on the fact that sometimes, when a philosopher does something, this affects other philosophers, who take notice of what he or she is doing in such a way that, as a result of their taking note of what the philosopher is doing, they modify their way of thinking about things philosophically, which, in turn, might make some difference to the further course of the history of philosophy. In this way, later philosophical activity is shaped or influenced by earlier activity.